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Abstract 
This working paper provides a background to the rebuilding of the educational sector 
in Somaliland, which had been completely destroyed during the civil war, developed 
again from very modest beginnings in the early 1990s, and includes manifold offers 
up to tertiary education a decade later. Arguably, the educational boom in the country 
is part of the second phase of peacebuilding, which began around 1997 and still 
continues. It involves extensive diasporic investments in the form of economic and 
social remittances. The case-study section in the second half of the paper presents 
two universities founded by diaspora and local actors. These universities are located 
in quite different regions of Somaliland. Jamacadda Geeska (International Horn 
University) in Hargeysa, the capital of Somaliland, is embedded in an economically 
striving and peaceful environment. Jamacadda Nugaal (Nugaal University) in 
Laascaanood is located in a politically contested and economically underdeveloped 
area.1
 
 The differently located case studies have been chosen to outline a more 
nuanced picture of the relation between diasporic engagement in the educational – 
particularly the tertiary – sector and sustainable peace. The different conditions in the 
two places help to understand in how far ‘external factors’, such as politics of 
recognition (on the side of Somaliland) and long-distance-nationalism, influence this 
relation. The study concludes that, on the one hand, diasporic engagement in 
education up to the tertiary sector has a peacebuilding effect in so far as it provides 
opportunities for a peaceful and potentially prosperous future for many youngsters 
and facilitates the transnational exchange of ideas and visions related to social 
development and tolerance. On the other hand, however, follow-up prospects for 
most graduates are currently missing. The structural transformation from a war-torn 
to a peaceful society in Somaliland, to which the re-building of the educational sector 
can contribute, is endangered by unemployment, poverty, and a lack of government 
planning.  
                                                 
1 Names of Somali places, institutions, and persons in this text generally follow the Somali orthography. The Latin 
‘c’ stands for a sound close to the Arabic ‘ع’ (ayn); ‘x’ denotes ‘ح’ (ha), as in, e.g., Laascaanood or in Faarax. 
Exceptions are made only in the case of Mogadishu, which is so well established in English, and if Somali authors 
use anglicised versions of their names themselves.  
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1 Introduction2
 
 
This paper argues that the largely diaspora-driven (re-)construction of the 
educational sector up to the tertiary level in Somaliland can contribute to 
peacebuilding. Its contribution is mostly indirect, through providing the younger 
generation, which essentially is a civil-war and post-state-collapse generation, with 
chances for a peaceful and economically promising future. The case studies 
presented below and particularly the interviews with university students show, 
however, that the tertiary sector in Somaliland is currently about to reach a ‘dead 
end’. There are many educational provisions but much too few job opportunities for 
graduates in the country. Clearly, education alone cannot consolidate peace in a 
post-conflict society in the long run. It has to be embedded in a wider political and 
economic context beneficial to its peacebuilding potential, which is currently missing 
in Somaliland. Thus, diasporic contributions to the educational sector helped to build 
peace in Somaliland since the second half of the 1990s. Now, in 2010, it is the 
government’s turn to take on the issue and introduce economic and other policies 
that, first, create jobs, and second, structure education in a way that contributes to 
fulfilling the needs of the country’s economy. Yet, this change from diaspora-driven to 
government-driven education is not in sight, despite some initial steps of the Ministry 
of Education to structure and regulate the educational developments in Somaliland. 
Human and financial resources are lacking in a country that is, first, not 
internationally recognised; second, engaged in an ongoing conflict with its neighbour 
(Puntland); and third, corruption-prone so that much of the government revenue is 
not properly accounted for.3
 This paper is divided into four parts. The first part provides the conceptual 
background by discussing the relationship between education and peacebuilding and 
  
                                                 
2 This study is part of the DIASPEACE-project financed by the EU under the 7th framework agreement. 
Institutional support and the finances for field research were provided by the Max Planck Institute for Social 
Anthropology in Halle/Saale, Germany. I wish to thank the Academy for Peace and Development in Hargeysa for 
having hosted me during my stay between December 2008 and May 2009. My informants, who have spent 
considerable time telling me about their views of and experiences with education before and after the Somali civil 
war, made this research possible. I am particularly grateful to the heads, staff, and students of Jamacadda 
Geeska and Jamacadda Nugaal for having accepted me at their universities. My thanks go also to Axmed 
Cabdullahi Du’aale, my research assistant, to Axmed Daakir, who facilitated my stay in Laascaanood, and to 
Aadan Ibrahim, who helped me with some translations for this paper. A much earlier version of this paper has 
been discussed by the participants of Prof. Richard Rottenburg’s social anthropological research colloquium at 
the University of Halle/Saale, while a close-to-final version was read by Peter Buckland, Lee Cassanelli and Anna 
Lindley. I profited from all their comments and criticism. All remaining errors are mine. 
3 On 26 June 2010 Axmed Siilaanyo, the candidate of the Kulmiye party, was elected new President of 
Somaliland. In an interview shortly after his election, Siilaanyo emphasised that fighting corruption was among the 
highest priorities of his government (IRIN 2 July 2010).  
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pointing to the main actors involved in the educational sector in Somaliland: the 
members of the diaspora. The second part outlines the particularities of education in 
the Somali context before and after the civil war. The third part deals with the political 
and legal context of the diasporic engagement in the educational sector. Together, 
these three parts form the background for the fourth and most substantial part, which 
presents the case studies: two diaspora-driven universities in two different regions of 
Somaliland. Comparing them leads to further insights about the role of ‘external’ (not 
education-related) factors concerning the relationship between education and 
peacebuilding.  
 
 
2 Education, peacebuilding, and the diaspora 
 
2.1 The relationship between education and peacebuilding 
The relationship between education, peace, and conflict is complex.4 Education 
clearly has several ‘faces’: First, it can contribute to conflict escalation through 
teaching and perpetuating discrimination, racist and other stereotypes, dehumanising 
the ‘opponent’ in a multi-ethnic conflict setting, and so forth (Bush and Saltarelli 2000: 
9-16). Education systems ‘tend to reproduce skills, values, attitudes, and social 
relations of dominant groups in society’ (World Bank 2005: 9). Distorted curricula 
and/or frustrated expectations of graduates and teachers may become sources of 
social tensions and violent conflict (ibid. 9-10; Rose and Greeley 2006: 9).5
                                                 
4 Education in this paper, if not indicated differently, refers to formal education in schools and universities.  
 
Additionally, educational institutions, which in modern nation states are usually under 
government control, are prone to reproduce the official propaganda. Second, 
particularly in civil or guerrilla wars, schools and universities and their personnel are 
among the primary victims. They are attacked as representatives of the opponent, 
e.g., hated governments. Their buildings are looted and destroyed. Teachers and 
students are robbed, injured, (forcibly) recruited, and/or killed. It can take many years 
until the damage done to the educational infrastructure and the human resources 
involved is undone (World Bank 2005: 13-20). Prolonged violent conflict may produce 
a ‘lost’ generation of youths without any formal education (Abdullahi 2007: 16). 
5 In his account of the Sierra Leonean civil war in the 1990s, Paul Richards attached great significance to the 
concept of ‘excluded intellectuals’. He interpreted the frustrations of civil servants and particularly teachers in 
Sierra Leone as one ‘root cause’ for the war (Richards 1996).  
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Finally, education can help to overcome or prevent conflict if it provides space for 
communication across social, ethnic or other lines of division and teaches tolerance 
and respect for each other. Also the ‘demilitarisation’ of the mind and the provision of 
alternative historical reference points can contribute to long-term peacebuilding. This 
requires inspired and dedicated actors (teachers, students, politicians) who wish to 
make a change (Bush and Saltarelli 2000: 16-21).6
It has to be emphasised, however, that the link between education and peace 
respectively peacebuilding is rather indirect. Education can have beneficial economic 
effects by providing a skilled work force that may contribute to the increase of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (McMahon 1999: 108-109). According to World Bank 
(2005: 8) analysts, ‘reducing poverty is a critical strategy for reducing the likelihood of 
civil war.’ There may be various ‘feedback effects’ of education on economic growth, 
human rights, and political stability. McMahon (1999: 94) argued that ‘[e]ducated 
citizens with access to modern media communications are able to be better informed 
about what is going on, speak more articulately, and to some extent in co-operation 
with industrial interests to be more economically influential in strengthening their 
political rights. Human rights can often be a motivating force, and improvements in 
human rights can also follow as part of the process.’ McMahon’s argumentation is 
flawed in the sense that it privileges citizenship over other forms of political 
belonging, and industrial over other forms of economy. It also excludes eloquent 
articulations of personal and/or community interests in so-called traditional societies 
by people without access to modern media and education. Nonetheless, his point 
that education can have various feedback effects and, among other things, may be 
related to improvements of human rights, particularly in a world connected through 
modern media, is valid.  
  
In sum, the educational sector can be a driving force behind the escalation of 
(violent) conflict, a prime victim of violent conflict, and a means to overcome violence 
and hatred. What role education plays depends on the social, economic and political 
environment in which education is embedded. Education does not exist in isolation, 
and the borders between classroom and society are permeable (Bush and Saltarelli 
2000: 4).  
                                                 
6 The question, what kind of education contributes to peacebuilding is addressed below. 
 8 
The relationship between education and peacebuilding has to be qualified 
further. It certainly plays a role what kind of education we are talking about. Mc 
Mahon seems to have a rather unspecific ‘standard’ modern education in mind 
(based on literacy and computer skills) when relating it to the ability to make use of 
modern media and gain information. There are, however, also ‘peace education’ and 
‘peacebuilding education’. According to Mitschke (2003: 33) peace education aims at 
fostering knowledge, abilities, and attitudes that are necessary to settle and/or 
prevent conflicts. Peacebuilding education is a wider concept and focuses on the 
structural or ‘root’ causes of conflicts. While peace education consists of a rather 
static set of tools, peacebuilding education emphasises process and change (ibid.). 
Peacebuilding education is more encompassing and plays a role beyond classrooms 
and schools (ibid. 35). Bush and Saltarelli (2000: 27) finally emphasise that 
peacebuilding education is a bottom-up process driven by those affected by conflict 
and violence, whereas peace education constitutes rather an external framework 
employed in a conflict setting by mostly ‘northern’ experts. Despite these differences 
both concepts are related. Peacebuilding education incorporates aspects of peace 
education such as conflict management skills and the cultivation of values supporting 
tolerance and nonviolence (Mitschke 2003: 35).  
In the Somali context, which is the central focus of this paper, it is clear that 
peace or peacebuilding education is not (yet) in place. The Minister for Education of 
the Republic of Somaliland mentioned in a speech in Hargeysa in 2000 that his 
ministry was ‘on the verge of adopting a program of “culture of peace” to be part and 
parcel of the lower and upper curriculum’ (Ahmed Yusuf Dualeh 2000). However, 
when I did my field research in late 2008 and early 2009, none of the students I 
interviewed answered my question about education for peace in their school days in 
the affirmative. Below, I will consider whether some aspects of the diasporic 
pedagogical visions that inform one of the case studies presented in this paper (the 
one on Jamacadda Geeska) could qualify as peacebuilding education, at least in a 
wider sense.  
Related to this discussion, it is important to clarify the concept of 
peacebuilding. In public and policy-driven discourses, peacebuilding is frequently 
used as a normative concept as if it were clear what ‘peace’ exactly is and, secondly, 
as if peace per se were always ‘good’. Such a normative understanding of 
peacebuilding risks supporting the interests of those in power by emphasising 
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stability/status quo over reform/(social, political and/or economic) change. Reform 
and/or change may come along with upheavals, contestation and revolutions, but in 
the long run, they may contribute to the transformation of injustices that previously 
bred conflict. In this working paper, peacebuilding is therefore understood as 
(nonviolent) activities that aim at the sustainable transformation of structural conflict 
factors and patterns (Minutes of the WP3 Workshop).7
The effectiveness of education with regard to peacebuilding depends on a 
host of ‘external’ factors, such as: first, ‘sound policies and committed leadership’ at 
the local and national level; second, ‘adequate operational capacity at all levels’, 
including the capacities of communities and the incentives for students to participate; 
third, ‘financial resources’; fourth, a sound understanding of the situation at hand, 
which would guide curriculum development and investments into education; and 
finally, strategic planning and time (World Bank 2005: 29-30; Rose and Greeley 
2006: 3,7-9).  
 Structural conflict factors and 
patterns have to be identified in each local context separately. On a general level, 
they include, e.g., social inequality, religious, ethnic or clan antagonism, 
discrimination, political oppression, and so forth. 
Against the background of these complexities, Abdullahi’s (2007: 42) position 
that there ‘is no better long-term solution to armed conflicts than providing quality 
education to the community involved’ seems too enthusiastic. Rather, education 
systems ‘provide only one of the key institutional networks for peacebuilding, and 
what is possible and effective in building peace in the wider society conditions (and is 
conditioned by) what is possible and effective in schools’ (World Bank 2005: 85, 
italics added).  
 
2.2 Diasporic engagement 
We turn now to the question of who has been involved in peacebuilding and the (re-) 
construction of the education system after the civil war in Somaliland. The literature 
outlined above implicitly or explicitly takes it for granted that most of the work would 
be done by national and international institutions. In the case of Somaliland, 
however, the capacities of the government are extremely low. Since the country does 
not enjoy international recognition, international assistance is also limited. The 
                                                 
7 This definition ultimately goes back to Johan Galtung’s understanding of peace, as outlined, e.g., in Galtung 
(1996). It was introduced within the Diaspeace project by Cindy Horst.  
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educational sector is largely in the hands of private actors, most of them with 
relations to or a background in the diaspora. My argument that diaspora contributions 
actually are the main factor driving education in the country is based on the fact that 
money sent from abroad is not only used to build schools and universities and 
provide teaching materials, but also pays teachers and student fees, and frees 
particularly younger family members from income generating obligations so that they 
can pursue education.8 Additionally, diasporic actors who at least temporarily return, 
sometimes get involved as teachers, headmasters, university chancellors or in other 
positions. In short, superior wealth and education endow diasporic actors with 
important roles in the educational and other sectors in Somaliland (and Somalia) in 
the absence of effective state institutions and nation-wide, systematic and long-term 
development projects (Menkhaus 2009: 189).9
The details about the current debate on diasporas and diasporic engagement 
in general have been discussed elsewhere (Hoehne et al. 2010); suffice it to stress 
that diasporas are certainly not homogenous groups (Sökefeld 2006). In my view, the 
only precondition for diasporic engagement is that at ‘a given moment in time the 
sense of connection to a homeland must be strong enough to resist forgetting, 
assimilating or distancing’ (Shuval 2000: 43).
  
10 A kind of local or national patriotism, 
together with the will to contribute to the ‘betterment’ of the situation at home, 
constitutes a strong motivation for diasporic engagement. This is part of what 
Vertovec (1997) called the ‘diaspora consciousness’ that emanates from the 
migrants’ awareness of their precarious situation as guests and foreigners in the 
country of residence (ibid. 281-283). Still, ‘hard-line’ ideas and ethnic/tribal/clan 
chauvinism can also prevail among members of the diaspora who then, in the context 
of long-distance nationalism, contribute to conflict escalation rather than to 
peacebuilding (Anderson 1992; Anthias 1998: 367; Orjuela 2006).11
                                                 
8 Below I discuss the material contribution of diasporic actors in comparison to state institutions and international 
organisations and NGOs in Somaliland. 
  
9 International assistance for Somalia and Somaliland consists mostly of emergency and humanitarian aid, or 
funding for the African Union (AU) ‘peacekeeping’ mission in Mogadishu. These projects are all short-term and 
confined to the pockets of the former Somali Republic that are deemed secure enough for aid operations.  
10 Anthias (1998: 569) stresses that even the post-colonial perspective on diaspora as a potentially anti-
essentialist, post-national concept (see e.g. Clifford 1994; Appadurai 1996) entails a notion of home (often 
associated with a ‘fatherland’) from where the members of the diaspora (or their ancestors) dispersed. In fact, 
without dispersion from ‘home’ the concept of diaspora makes hardly any sense. In this way, a primordial aspect 
is inbuilt in the diaspora identity.  
11 It has to be noted that long-distance nationalism comprises various forms of political engagement, such as 
voting, campaigning, lobbying, reform projects etc. of diasporic actors with regard to their ‘home’. It therefore is 
not only related to the fostering of (violent) conflict (Glick-Schiller 2004). 
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The most common way of diasporic engagement is sending money to family 
members at home. These individual financial remittances contribute to household 
survival; often they also support the education of one or several family members 
(Lubkeman 2008: 54-55). Money collections in the diaspora are used to support 
larger projects back home, such as the building of schools, roads, or hospitals. 
Remitted money can of course also finance conflict and war (Maimbo 2006).12 In 
many countries, the volume of individual financial remittances per year makes up a 
considerable part of the state budget. In the case of Somaliland, it exceeds the 
official state budget by far. Menkhaus (2009: 189) observed that ‘[e]conomically, the 
US$500 million to US$1 billion that the Somali diaspora remits annually to relatives in 
Somalia dwarfs all other sources of revenue in Somalia and essentially floats an 
otherwise dysfunctional economy.’ The negative side of the diaspora money is that 
governments may take financial remittances as an excuse for neglecting the 
provision of services, while private persons are discouraged from searching for 
employment and taking responsibility for their own lives. Thus, financial remittances 
come with certain costs and can constitute a ‘moral hazard’ (Menkhaus 2009: 193).13
The other type of remittances is social remittances. They comprise the transfer 
of ideas, values, norms, and concepts (Levitt 1998). These may contribute to 
peacebuilding in the country of origin but can also foster conflicts, in case, for 
instance, the cultural values of diaspora members and people at home differ 
markedly. The political engagement of diaspora actors in the country of origin is a 
double-edged sword. It can have beneficial effects for peacebuilding and political 
stability, if sincere and skilled personalities invest and engage back home. But if 
diaspora actors pursue their individual interests on the costs of the local population 
and, once a political plan did not work out, simply return abroad on a foreign passport 
and leave the ‘mess’ behind in the country of origin, political engagement can 
become destructive (Ibrahim forthcoming).  
 
The Somali context is a contemporary example for extensive diaspora 
engagement, which concerns conflict escalation and perpetuation as well as re-
construction and peacebuilding. There are a number of studies on the economic and 
                                                 
12 The Somali National Movement (SNM), the guerrilla organisation that took control of much of north-western 
Somalia in 1991and declared Somaliland’s independence, was largely financed by diaspora money (Reno 2003: 
24).  
13 After she had heard about the important role of financial remittances for people in Somaliland, Regina 
Bendokat, a former World Bank economist commented that Somaliland was an externally funded welfare-state 
(personal communication Regina Bendokat, Freiburg, 13.09.2009).  
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political roles of Somali diasporic actors (Ahmed 2000; Gundel 2002; Kent, von 
Hippel and Bradbury 2004; Hansen 2007; Cassanelli 2007; Horst 2008; Kleist 2008a, 
2008b, 2009; Abdulqadir 2009; Galipo 2009; Lindley 2009a, 2009b; Menkhaus 2009; 
Sheikh and Healy 2009). So far, however, the diasporic engagement in the 
educational sector in Somaliland and its potential contribution to peacebuilding in the 
local context has gained only limited attention (Abdi 1998; Morah 2000; Abdullahi 
2007; Lindley 2008). This is somewhat astonishing, given the mushrooming of 
educational institutions up to the tertiary sector in Somaliland in the last few years 
(since circa 2000), which frequently involved members of the diaspora as innovators, 
investors or otherwise.  
 
2.3 Methodology 
The empirical data collection for this study took place in Somaliland between 
December 2008 and May 2009. In total, 42 individual interviews were conducted with 
students, heads, teachers, and other university staff, members of the administration 
at the national and the local level, civil society agents, poets, and ordinary people 
who were not directly involved in education at the time. Group interviews were held 
with six to eight students in Hargeysa and Laascaanood.14
During my field research, I was based in the capital city Hargeysa, where I 
spent four months. I first explored the field in consultation with my assistant and 
colleagues from the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Hargeysa before 
I choose Jamacadda Geeska (International Horn University), a recently established 
private university, as one of my case studies. It seemed to be a particularly 
interesting institution, since it had been founded by diaspora Somalis from Finland 
and Pakistan. It had a clear religious orientation, but also engaged in secular 
education and organised several high profile cultural and social events in Hargeysa 
 My questions focussed on 
the local understandings of peacebuilding; the educational background of the 
interviewees and the developments of education in Somalia/Somaliland before and 
after the civil war and state collapse (depending on the age and the experiences of 
the respondents); the relation between education and sustainable peace in 
Somaliland; the role of members of the diaspora in Somaliland; and the perception of 
diasporic actors by locals without diaspora background and vice versa.  
                                                 
14 I aimed at gender balance during the group interviews, but could not always succeed in mobilising as many 
female as male students. Of the 42 individual interviews, 10 were conducted with women. 
 13 
during the time of my field research. The second case study became Jamacadda 
Nugaal (Nugaal University) in Laascaanood in the borderlands between Somaliland 
and Puntland. Here I spent only one week.15
 
 Laascaanood is located in the periphery 
and, furthermore, in a contested zone (see Map I). Somaliland and Puntland had 
engaged repeatedly in military clashes over Laascaanood. In October 2007, 
Somaliland had taken control of the town. I had hoped to acquire some information 
about the role of the diaspora in the ongoing conflict.  
 
 
Map I: Political divisions in northern Somalia, © MPI for Social Anthropology 
 
                                                 
15 Due to security regulations for foreigners in Somaliland, I was only allowed to leave the capital city with an 
armed escort. This burdened my research budget and hampered the ethnographic field research. In 
Laascaanood, my movements were restricted. Restrictions were much less in Hargeysa. My data on the situation 
in Laascaanood are nonetheless rich, since first, I had conducted extensive field research there in 2003 and 2004 
and still had good relations to many local informants, and second, I had a chance to interview several of my key 
informants from Laascaanood during their visits to Hargeysa. 
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I also attended several lectures and cultural events organised by the 
International Horn University and the University of Hargeysa. In Burco (where I 
stopped briefly on my way to Laascaanood) and Laascaanood, I gave presentations 
on my project and answered the questions of students. Finally, I followed the daily 
political and other events through the local newspapers and discussions with my 
acquaintances. This helped me to embed the information acquired through interviews 
in the wider context of the developments in Somaliland in 2009.  
 
 
3 Education in the Somali context before and after war and state collapse 
 
This section develops the necessary background to the educational sector in the 
Somali context. It focuses on religious education as well as on the primary and 
secondary sector, since this is where, historically, education in the Somali peninsula 
started. The tertiary sector only began to play a role in post-colonial time. Also, after 
the state collapse it was the last sector of education to be rehabilitated.  
 
3.1 Pre- and post-colonial education 
Education in pre-colonial time was non-formal and mostly family based; its subjects 
were manners, family and clan history, and skills necessary for survival in the 
particular environment of the Somali peninsula, much of which was semi-arid and 
used by pastoral nomads and agro-pastoralists with only a few sedentary 
communities and urban centres (Banafunzi 1996; Abdullahi 2007: 25). This 
‘traditional’ form of education was supplemented by Islamic teachings. Besides old 
Islamic centres, such as Harar and Mogadishu, itinerant Sheikhs were responsible 
for the basic religious education of the masses (Abdi 1998: 329).16
Colonial expansion reached the Horn in the late 19th century. Yet, it was not 
before the 1930s that the colonial powers, Great Britain in the northwest and Italy in 
the northeast and the south, began to establish a basic educational infrastructure. 
Somalis viewed colonial education, which they equated with Christian education, with 
suspicion (Kakwenzire 1986: 767; Abdullahi 2007: 28). Attempts to establish 
‘modern’ schools in the British Protectorate reputedly provoked demonstrations and 
  
                                                 
16 The Horn of Africa had come under Islamic influence around the 10th century. It took several centuries until 
Islam reached the hinterlands. 
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violent attacks (Samatar 2001: 645-646; Cassanelli and Farah 2007: 93). In 1950, 
only a couple of elementary and two intermediate schools existed in British 
Somaliland. A Vocational Training Centre was opened in Amuud near the town of 
Booroma in 1952. Somaliland became independent on 26 June 1960 with two 
secondary schools, one in Sheikh and one in Amuud (Samatar 2001: 647; Cassanelli 
and Farah 2007: 93-94). The Italian part, which was officially administered under a 
UN trusteeship agreement between 1950 and 1960, was more advanced. Here, the 
basis for a modern educational system was set up, in preparation for independence 
on 1 July 1960. In 1953, the Institute for Social Science, Law and Economics was 
established in Mogadishu. It later became the University Institute, which provided the 
foundation for the Somali National University in post-colonial time (Abdullahi 2007: 
30-31). It has to be noted that, in pre-colonial and colonial times, any educational 
system existing in the Somali peninsula privileged male students. Girls’ and women’s 
education was mostly limited to basic religious learning and household skills; higher 
religious or secular education was a male domain.17
The Somali Republic was founded through the union of Somaliland (the ex-
British Protectorate) and (Italian) Somalia on 1 July 1960. The country’s nationalist 
leadership saw modern education as an instrument for overcoming ‘tribal’ divisions 
within Somali society. Many city dwellers recognised mass education as ‘best 
available venue for socio-economic advancement’ (Abdi 1998: 332). The pastoral-
nomads, however, who in the mid-20th century constituted the majority of the 
population, particularly in northern Somalia, remained suspicious of modern 
education.
  
18 Yuusuf Shacir, a famous poet from Somaliland, who himself grew up in 
the countryside, asserted that until recently nomadic families sent only the ‘useless’ 
boys to the schools in the towns. Those who were not good for animal herding should 
learn in schools (Interview Yuusuf Shacir, Hargeysa, 7 April 2009).19
 Education and literacy was boosted under the ‘revolutionary’ regime of 
Maxamed Siyad Barre (1969-91). In 1970, the Somali National University was 
founded in Mogadishu. In 1990, just before the state collapse, more than 4000 
  
                                                 
17 This only changed visibly after 1969, under the revolutionary regime of Siyad Barre (see below). Even then, the 
enrolment rate of girls and young women in institutions of secondary and tertiary education was much lower than 
the rate of male students.  
18 The north and the southwest of the Somali peninsula was until around the 1950s predominantly inhabited by 
pastoral-nomads. In central and southern Somalia, agro-pastoralists and farmers resided. City dwellers, mostly 
merchants and craft-workers inhabited the ancient towns along the Benaadir coast. 
19 Education for girls beyond basic Islamic learning was obviously not relevant at all in the nomadic context. 
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students were enrolled in the university that comprised 11 faculties, from education to 
medicine and journalism. In 1973 the Latin script was introduced for Somali. 
Subsequently, a large-scale literacy campaign raised general literacy. Primary school 
enrolment rose exponentially (Abdi 1998: 333-334).20
 These successes were undone in the 1980s, when the government fought 
militant opposition movements and resorted to the violent oppression of parts of the 
population. The resulting militarisation of the society and civil war that escalated in 
northern Somalia in 1988 had negative effects on education. School enrolment 
declined and most government spending went to defence and security (Abdi 1998: 
334-335; Samatar 2001: 644). Morah (2000: 309) summarised:  
  
 
Public sector primary education in Somalia was in deep trouble long before 
the collapse of the Siad Barre dictatorship and the Somali state in 1991. Its 
greatest strength was in the mid to late 1970s when primary school enrolment 
reached 55%, only to decline to about 33% in 1988. The devastating clan wars 
of the 1990s only dealt the final blow to an already collapsing public education 
system.  
 
3.2 The effect of civil war and state collapse on education 
During the civil war, the formal educational system was razed to the ground. 
Hargeysa and most urban centres in the northwest became warzones from 1988 
onward. Mogadishu and the south followed in 1991. Public institutions, including 
schools, were looted and stripped of doors, roofs, and windows (Abdi 1998: 327; 
Samatar 2001: 649; Cassanelli and Farah 2007: 91). Teachers and students were 
killed, or they fled or joined the armed factions. Abdi (1998: 336) argued that the civil 
war introduced an informal system of education that perpetuated destruction by 
teaching a ‘culture of thuggery, war-like attitudes toward life, clan and sometimes 
sub-clan fighting, and survival on the fringes of an otherwise disintegrated society.’ In 
his view, the socialisation of Somalia’s youth into violence provided an obstacle for 
ending the fighting. Many fighters preferred continued civil war to lasting peace since 
the latter was something they did not know and possibly feared (ibid.: 337).21
                                                 
20 The promotion of secular and ‘revolutionary’ education under the socialist regime did not trigger positive results 
everywhere. In some conservative Muslim communities the government system was perceived as intrusion and a 
deviation from the ‘right path’, which was to be an education firmly based on Islam. Banafunzi (1996: 340) 
observed that ‘[t]he 1970s and 1980s became the darkest decades in the history of education in Brava and 
elsewhere in Somalia.’  
  
21 For an interesting sociological study on Mogadishu’s war-affected youth, see Marchal (1993).  
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 Despite the ongoing civil war in southern Somalia, the educational sector 
experienced some reconstruction. In 2010, Mogadishu, the destroyed capital of 
collapsed Somalia, has a dozen universities funded by the diaspora and mostly 
Islamic charities. Over the past two decades, secondary schools were established in 
many places all over southern and central Somalia, again, usually with help from 
abroad (Abdulqadir 2009: 13-18). This should not obscure the fact that the continued 
war and instability has a tremendously negative effect on education there.22
 
 Lindley 
(2008: 403) stressed that the quality of primary schools varies across the Somali 
areas. It is the highest in peaceful Somaliland. The variations at all other educational 
levels up to the university between southern Somalia and Somaliland are similar. 
Continued civil war does not necessarily make education impossible, but it makes it 
more difficult for the students and teachers. In Laascaanood, I interviewed one staff 
member of the university who had graduated from Benaadir University in Mogadishu 
in 2008. He described how the whole university sometimes had to flee due to 
fighting. The most important teaching materials (books etc.) were taken along if 
possible (Interview, Cabdillahi Yuusuf Cawil, Laascaanood, 14 April 2009).  
3.3 Post-war reconstruction in Somaliland 
In contrast to southern Somalia, where civil war is continuing, a peaceful social and 
political order has been established in northern Somalia since 1991. The secession 
of the northwest as the Republic of Somaliland (within the borders of the former 
British Protectorate) in May 1991 marked the beginning of this extraordinary 
development.23
 
 Since Somaliland does not enjoy international recognition, it is not 
‘eligible’ for large-scale international aid. Only a few humanitarian organisations and 
international NGOs began to work in the country in the mid 1990s. Thus, immediately 
after the state collapse people in Somaliland did not see much non-Somali 
involvement. Education had to start from scratch: 
In Somaliland, prior to the outbreak of large-scale civil war in 1988, there were 
roughly 200 primary schools with about 34,300 pupils. By the end of the war 
years, most of the school buildings [lay] in ruins. A UN assessment in 1992 
found that up to 15% of the schools had their walls demolished and timbers 
looted; 75% were without roofs and nearly 80% without doors, windows, 
                                                 
22 On 3 December 2009 a suicide bombing hit the Shamo Hotel in Mogadishu during a graduation ceremony for 
medical students of one of the local universities. Dozens of students were killed.  
23 I discussed the details of the political and social dynamics in northern Somalia since 1991 elsewhere (Hoehne 
2009).  
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fixtures, etc. The few schools still reasonably intact were taken over by 
squatters and displaced persons. Effectively, there were no schools for 
Somaliland children to attend in the aftermath of the war (Morah 2000: 309). 
 
The first educational institutions to start working again in Somaliland (and 
elsewhere in war-torn Somalia) were Koran schools (Morah 2000). This is in 
accordance with the remarkable resilience of educational systems in general. The 
World Bank analysts found that education during conflict almost never comes to a 
complete standstill for an extended period. At least some basic and/or primary 
education continues, ‘albeit with reduced public support and a consequent 
deterioration in quality’ (World Bank 2005: 22). In the Somali context, Islamic 
education has had a long tradition. Moreover, the flourishing of Koran schools in 
Somaliland after 1991 pointed to an ongoing Islamic ‘revival’. Against the background 
of internecine war, often fought along clan and sub-clan lines, many Somalis 
considered Islam as a way out of personal and collective disaster.  
 Secular schooling began slowly. It was facilitated through private and 
community initiatives. The investments basically focussed on the clan-homelands of 
the respective diaspora groups. There were, however, also collective investments 
transcending clan-belonging (Samatar 2001: 647; Lindley 2008: 408-9; Abdulkadir 
2009: 18-21).24
 The first initiatives of social and political reconstruction were overshadowed by 
episodes of renewed civil war in the early 1990s. After the SNM had taken control of 
Somaliland, the movement was torn apart in power-struggles between its leading 
commanders, who mobilised their clans and sub-clans for support (Renders 2006). 
Male teenagers were recruited again for war; others had refused to demobilise and 
were still armed. Many people remained outside of the country and resided in 
 Since school buildings had been destroyed or looted, schooling 
frequently took place either in school-houses without roofs, windows, and doors or 
‘under the tree’. Many of my younger informants remembered that sun, rain, and 
wind affected the schooling. They added that during their first years back in school in 
Somaliland in the early 1990s they sat on milk powder tins turned upside down; they 
had no textbooks and the teachers had no blackboards. The ‘curriculum’ consisted of 
what teachers could remember off their heads (Group interviews with students, 
Laascaanood, 14 April 2009; Hargeysa, 5 April 2009).  
                                                 
24 It has to be noted that schools in small villages in very remote places are sometimes the only educational 
institution for a whole district. In the rainy season, when nomadic families gather around water points nearby, the 
number of students in village schools can rise dramatically.  
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refugee camps in Ethiopia. Those in Somaliland who wished to reintegrate in a 
peaceful society and had entered the few existing schools up to the secondary level 
were left without follow-up opportunities (Samatar 2001: 648). For many youngsters, 
looting and robbing became a way of life. Traditional authorities and community 
leaders worked through a series of local peace-conferences between 1991 and 1996 
for peace and stability in Somaliland (Farah and Lewis 1993; Terlinden and Ibrahim 
2008; Walls 2009). Once this had been achieved in 1997, it facilitated the further 
rebuilding of a peaceful social and political order. Clan militias were integrated into 
the country’s national army or demobilised. Tellingly, the slogan for the 
demobilisation-campaign was qoriga dhig, qalinka qaad (put down the gun, take up 
the pen).  
The first university of Somaliland, Amuud University, was opened near the 
town of Boorama in Awdal region in 1998. Apart from some book donations from an 
international NGO, the project had been developed by and realised with the 
resources of the local and the diaspora community related to Awdal region.25
The intention of the founders of this university had been ‘to find an outlet for 
the many children in the region who had no real prospect of productive employment 
other than joining the roaming militias’ (Samatar 2001: 648). The actors involved 
were very conscious about not making Amuud a clan-owned institution but a 
university for all Somalis (Samatar 2001: 648-650). The University of Hargeysa 
followed in 2000. This institution had also been initiated by the diaspora, and local as 
well as diasporic actors joined hands in its establishment. Two steering committees, 
one in London and one in Hargeysa, were set up in 1997. Fowsiya Yuusuf Xaaji 
Aadan (Fawzia Yuusuf Haji Adam), one of the key actors and later first chancellor of 
the University of Hargeysa, travelled back and forth for several years between the UK 
and Somaliland to improve interaction. She and Sa’ad Cali Shire (Saad Ali Shire), a 
Somali businessman and the second leading person involved in the university 
project, used their extensive personal networks in Somaliland and abroad to acquire 
land and a building from the government in Hargeysa and to attract donations of 
 
Members of the diaspora from all over north-western Somaliland contributed as well. 
Amuud was the very first Somali university outside of Mogadishu in the south.  
                                                 
25 This region is predominantly inhabited by members of the Gadabuursi clan.  
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money and equipment.26
The foundation of the universities in Amuud and Hargeysa carried significance 
beyond the educational sector in Somaliland. These investments, like the building of 
the Ambassador Hotel near Hargeysa Airport (Ibrahim forthcoming), showed that the 
civil war was over and that the time had come to orient toward the future.
 The transnational coordination of the project was greatly 
facilitated through online conferences (MacGregor et al. 2008: 246-248). The 
motivation behind the engagement of Fowsiya and Sa’ad was twofold: they wished to 
provide the first generation of post-war secondary students in Somaliland with follow-
up opportunities. This was coupled with considerations about the development 
potential of better educated local students for the local/national market (ibid. 244-
245). These ‘double concerns’ about security and economy in the country of origin 
were typical for diaspora actors investing in education. Lindley (2008: 407) argued 
that ‘[r]emitters are often keen to try to ensure that their hard-earned remittances are 
used productively’. The money sent and the education provided should lead the way 
to employment and economic prosperity – of the family and the community. 
Moreover, she mentioned that, particularly in insecure places, schooling was and still 
is seen as a way to keep youngsters away from becoming militiamen (ibid.).  
27 Arguably, 
both projects had also a psychological effect in showing local and diaspora actors 
what they were capable of achieving together. In the following decade, hundreds of 
new schools and more than a dozen universities were established in Somaliland.28
 
 
The vast majority goes back to private initiatives, many of them related to the 
diaspora.  
 
4 Political and legal context of the diasporic engagement in the educational 
sector 
 
The establishment of universities in Somaliland is part of the second phase of more 
sustainable peacebuilding in the country that began in the second half of the 1990s. 
This phase is still ongoing in 2010. It involves local and diaspora entrepreneurs, who 
                                                 
26 Both Fowsiya and Sa’ad had studied abroad, in the USA, and later settled in London, where they started their 
investment in education back home in Somaliland.  
27 Menkhaus (2009: 194) stressed that large and visible investments by the diaspora in various places of war-torn 
Somalia ‘are important not only for the jobs they create but also for the sense of confidence they build locally that 
wealthy diaspora members believe in the future of the area enough to make a major fixed investment there.’ 
28 For similar developments in the south see Abdullahi (2007).  
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invest in everything from private clinics and pharmacies to research centres, shops, 
restaurants, small factories, political parties, schools, and universities. It therefore 
supports long-term political, economic, and social transformation. Diaspora actors 
who return, at least temporarily, transfer skills and knowledge to local people and 
institutions, and simultaneously become transformed themselves, through the contact 
with the local society. Continuous remittance flows from the diaspora secure the daily 
survival of many families in Somaliland. In addition, diaspora entrepreneurs 
constantly search for profitable investments and/or job opportunities in their country 
of origin. For instance, many diaspora returnees work as experts with language and 
other skills in international development organisations (Hansen 2007: 137-140; 
Lindley 2008: 406; Menkhaus 2009: 194-5; Ibrahim forthcoming; Interview Cawil 
Maxamed Faarax, Hargeysa, 8 April 2009).  
The connection between economic development and sustainable peace was 
underlined by most interviewees, many of them university students. They mentioned 
that peace in post-conflict Somaliland will last only if the younger generation has 
sufficient job opportunities. This position was frequently complemented by demands 
for ‘justice’. Since 2007, the government and political elites of Somaliland are 
involved in a series of scandals and crises concerning corruption, freedom of speech, 
electoral laws and regulations, and so forth. Many interviewees argued that 
sustainable peace can only be fostered if the government and the political elites 
respect the laws of the country (Interviews Hargeysa, December 2008-May 2009). In 
Laascaanood, the capital of the Sool region in the contested borderlands between 
Somaliland and Puntland, people reflected mostly on the armed confrontation. 
Laascaanood had been captured by Somaliland troops (evicting the Puntland army) 
in fall 2007 (Hoehne 2007, 2009). Since then, the situation had calmed down. Still, 
some locals and most members of the diaspora of the Dhulbahante clan inhabiting 
Sool are against what they perceive as Somaliland ‘occupation’. Puntland politicians 
vow to recapture the place. Interview partners therefore stressed that immediate 
peacebuilding has to include negotiations between the opposing sides at the national 
and the local level. Additionally, justice starts with the end of the isolation of the 
region. Only if international organisations are allowed to come and work in 
Laascaanood and its surroundings, and if these organisations open offices in town, 
can the marginality of the place be alleviated (Interviews Laascaanood, April 2009).  
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4.1 General regulations concerning the diaspora 
The Somaliland state apparatus includes no particular office for ‘Diaspora Affairs’, 
unlike Ghana and Ethiopia, for instance (Nieswand 2009: 20; Dereje forthcoming). 
Officially, the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs29
The Minister of Planning, who himself had spent many years abroad and 
worked for international organisations, maintained that members of the diaspora 
were not foreigners. They are citizens of Somaliland and have the same rights and 
duties as all other citizens; the same laws apply to their activities (Interview Cali 
Ibraahim Maxamed, Hargeysa 16 May 2009). The minister added that, depending on 
the field of investment, diaspora actors would have to register with the responsible 
government institution. All projects in the education sector certainly had to be 
discussed with the Ministry of Education (ibid.).  
 was responsible for the diaspora. 
In fact, however, the Director General (DG) of this ministry dealt with the issue. He 
stressed in an interview that the Somaliland government welcomed the investment of 
diaspora members, as they are perceived as assets (regarding their education and/or 
financial resources). If they wanted to implement a project, the government would 
provide them with the necessary land for free (Interview Cawil Maxamed Faarax, 
Hargeysa, 08.04.2009). But the government had no concrete policy toward the 
diaspora and diaspora-investments. There were some representatives of Somaliland 
abroad who functioned as contact persons. However, when a member of the 
diaspora wanted to do something at home, he/she was free to do so. Government 
officials certainly could give advice to investors, but nothing more (ibid.).  
 
4.2 Educational policies  
The current policy of the Ministry of Education is based on an ‘Education Sector 
Strategic Plan 2007-2011’ developed in 2006/2007. The document includes an 
overview over the educational sector and presents policies and strategies of the 
ministry. According to the ministry, the country currently is in a period of growth and 
stability (after it had been in a phase of recovery during the 1990s). Remittances from 
the diaspora, private investments, and NGO projects provide the basis for the current 
development (Ministry of Education 2007: 7). Government revenue in general is low, 
and expenses for education are minimal. The government budget for the Ministry of 
                                                 
29 This is the official English title. This position is different from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
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Education was 1.37 million US$ or around 6% of the total government expenditure in 
2006. Of that money, about 80% were used for the payment of salaries.30
In my view, this assumption is doubtful. Against the background of more than 
500 million US$ remitted by the Somali diaspora in general per year, a good part of 
which goes to Somaliland, it seems that the contribution of diaspora actors to 
education could be much higher than government and donor spending together. The 
students’ relatives abroad frequently provide for school and university fees, as well 
as for books and other learning materials. Financial remittances also free youngsters 
from income generation activities. If this is counted as part of funding the educational 
sector, then diasporic financial remittances certainly exceed the international 
support.
 Circa 8% 
were allocated to the universities and other education institutions. The rest went into 
the operating costs of the ministry and the regional offices. It was estimated that UN 
agencies and NGOs added 8-14 million US$ to the educational sector in 2006. The 
contribution by the diaspora communities to schools and universities could not be 
measured. Nonetheless, the government assumed that the external donors 
(meaning: UN organisations and international NGOs) ‘are the main funders of the 
education sector (ibid. 34).  
31
Since government salaries are insufficient, teachers in public schools rely on 
additional income through fees.
  
32 Some teachers, who are not on the government’s 
payroll, are financed by local communities, diaspora initiatives, and/or NGOs (ibid.: 
10). The precarious political position of Somaliland as a non-recognised state partly 
surrounded by hostile neighbours (Puntland and southern Somalia) results ‘in levels 
of expenditure on security which limit the capacity of the Government to invest in 
other sectors’ (ibid.: 7).33 School enrolment rates and literacy rates are low.34
                                                 
30 Approximately 37% of all civil servants of Somaliland, mostly teachers, are on the payroll of the ministry of 
education.  
 The 
ministry of education blames this on widespread poverty, lacking infrastructure 
particularly in the countryside, and continued problems related to displacement and 
31 Lindley (personal communication, 29.07.2010) stressed that the majority of the circa 500 remittance recipients 
she had surveyed in 2005 had said they used some of their remittances for education; of the 175 remitters 
surveyed in London, half had made donations for education in the Somali regions in the last year, averaging 
around 150 US$.  
32 Fees in public schools are usually 1-3 US$ per month.  
33 Around 60% of the budget are spent for security. 
34 Statistics are easily distorted, since no recent reliable census data exist for Somaliland and Somalia. The 
government in Hargeysa estimates that 3 million people reside in Somaliland, while UN institutions speak of about 
1.7 million people. These gross discrepancies, of course, influence the school enrolment rates.  
 24 
resettlement after the civil war (ibid.: 8). The Education Sector Strategic Plan 2007-
2011 adds that ‘[u]nemployment is high, and is compounded by the extensive use of 
khat [qaad] by a large proportion of the population, which is both incapacitating and 
expensive’ (ibid.). Yet, not only economic difficulties plague the educational sector. 
Hansen (2010) mentioned that many youngsters with nothing to do sign up for ‘khat 
university’ in the afternoons. They prefer chewing the mild stimulant to an education 
that most likely will not lead to a job anyway.35
At the level of the government, education is organised according to the 
general system of decentralisation that is officially in place in Somaliland. There are 
six regional (one for each region) and more than 20 district education officers. 
Districts are given primary responsibility for service delivery. Higher education is the 
responsibility of the universities, which are considered private, even if some of them 
receive moderate government funding. The ministry plans to set up a Commission for 
Higher Education (ibid.: 9). Up to 2007, the main achievements of the ministry, in its 
own perspective, were: the rehabilitation of schools, the re-establishment of a 
teaching force, the development of a Somaliland curriculum up to the secondary level 
in most subjects (with the exception of history, due to the contested nature of this 
subject in the post-civil-war society), the introduction of an examination system, and 
the collection of statistical data. Most of these have been achieved through the 
support of donors and local and diaspora communities. The main constraints faced 
by the ministry in developing the educational sector are poor ministerial facilities (in 
the centre, the regions, and the districts); limited capacity of the staff; lack of clear 
policy development; reliance on external actors (UN and NGOs) for agenda setting; 
and uncoordinated activities of UN agencies and NGOs, which undermine the 
accountability of educational staff to the ministry. Additionally, there are large 
geographical disparities in service provision, and many services are delivered by 
private actors and/or NGOs (ibid.: 9-10). The poor physical infrastructure of the 
country inhibits communication and exchange between the centre, the regional 
capitals, and the districts.  
  
For 2005/2006, the Ministry of Education provided the following data: there 
were over 516 primary schools, 58 of which private. The General Enrolment Ratio 
                                                 
35 Qaad is a mild stimulant chewed by most Somali men. The qaad tree grows in the Ethiopian highlands. Its 
leaves, which contain several psychoactive substances, are harvested and imported into Somaliland on a daily 
basis. For more details on qaad trade and consumption, see Hansen (2010). 
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(GER) for primary schools was 38.6%; the GER for girls was 31.1%, for boys 46.1% 
(ibid.: 11-12). The number of secondary schools was 41, 13 of which private. The 
GER for secondary schools was not provided, but since the total number of 
secondary students was just around 14,000, compared with more than 130,000 in 
primary school, it must be very low. Only about 23% of all secondary school students 
were female (ibid.: 13-14). Regarding secondary education, the ministry confirmed 
that it is ‘not yet at a stage where it can play its full role in producing young people 
who will help drive national economic growth’ (ibid.: 15). Several universities provided 
training for primary school teachers. Only Amuud University had a secondary teacher 
education centre. Teacher training was supported by external donors within the 
framework of the ‘Strengthening the Capacity of Teacher Training’ (SCOTT) 
programme.  
The ministry lists only four universities (Amuud, Golis, Hargeysa, and Burco) 
for 2006, with a total number of about 1,300 students, roughly 25% of whom were 
female. All four universities were considered private, but received small grants of 14-
20,000 US$ from the government. These covered only a small part of the costs of the 
universities. ‘Other constraints include limited capacity, quality of staff and curricula, 
and the low competitiveness of graduates in the current job market. […] Courses are 
developed based on academic courses outside of Somaliland rather than from 
identified labour market needs. It is difficult to attract qualified academics and the 
potential to undertake research is limited. Female enrolment is low’ (ibid.: 15). My 
own observations suggest that the situation has not changed substantially since 
2006. It is safe to assume that in 2009 the number of schools and students was 
slightly higher than the figures given by the ministry. Also, more universities and 
colleges were founded and the number of students in the tertiary sector grew.36
The government is currently working up an education act. It has been drafted 
and submitted to the cabinet. In May 2009, it had not yet been passed on to the 
House of Representatives for discussion (Interview, Cali Cabdi Odawaa, Director 
General of the Ministry of Education, Hargeysa, 19 February 2009). This constitutes 
 
Nonetheless, the structural conditions and patterns – lack of funding, capacity, and 
infrastructure; gender imbalance; externally driven development – have not changed.  
                                                 
36 Hargeysa University alone was said to have had around 3000 students in 2009. 
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a considerable delay, since the act was originally planned to get into force in 2008 
(Ministry of Education 2007: 26).  
 To sum up: there is no consistent policy of the Somaliland government toward 
the diaspora. The activities of diasporic actors are generally welcome, but the 
government does not systematically promote or monitor them (Lindley 2008: 409). 
Members of the diaspora are perceived as citizens, to whom the laws of Somaliland 
apply once they enter the country. Since 1991, the educational sector has developed 
largely unregulated. In 2006/2007, the Ministry of Education set out to coordinate and 
plan policies and projects. As the sector is seriously underfinanced, external donors 
and particularly diaspora communities play very significant roles in funding and 
developing the education system in Somaliland. Legal regulations that would most 
probably help coordination, standardisation, and long-term planning are pending.  
 The following section shows the concrete working of two universities founded 
by the diaspora. The universities are presented in their respective local context in two 
quite different regions of Somaliland. One context is the Somaliland’s capital, which 
is economically striving and peaceful. The other is Laascaanood, the capital of the 
politically and militarily contested Sool region that suffers from economic 
marginalisation. These two locations arguably occupy two extreme ends of a 
continuum regarding security and stability in Somaliland.37
 
 They were chosen to 
outline a more nuanced picture of the relation between diasporic engagement in the 
educational sector (with a special focus on the tertiary sector) and sustainable peace. 
The different conditions in the two places also help to realise in how far ‘external 
factors’ influence this relation.  
 
5 Case Study 1: Jamacadda Geeska/International Horn University (IHU) 
 
Jamacadda Geeska is located in Hargeysa, the capital city of Somaliland. Due to the 
civil war more than 80% of the city (and many other towns in northwestern Somalia) 
lay in ruins in 1991. The region seceded from the rest of collapsing Somalia on 18 
May 1991. While this independence has not yet been recognised by Somalia or any 
other country, people in Somaliland, together with the diaspora and some 
                                                 
37 On the variations of political developments (including state control and security) in the different regions of 
Somaliland, see the highly innovative study of Terlinden (2008).  
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international organisations/NGOs, rebuilt their country from the ruins. Internal 
conflicts ravaged parts of Hargeysa, Burco, and Berbera until the mid-1990s. Since 
1997, as outlined above, physical and political reconstruction progress.  
 
5.1 Diaspora experiences: biographical notes 
Jamacadda Geeska goes back to the initiative of four diaspora Somalis. Three of 
them resided in Finland and one in Pakistan between the early 1990s and the early 
2000s.38
 Still, the two men experienced being in the diaspora differently. Cali was 
younger and, in his own perception, adapted easily. For Sheikh Almis, life in Finland 
came along with fundamental challenges. He confirmed that initially, in 1993, he had 
thought that ‘unbeliever is unbeliever, and Muslim is Muslim’. His idea had been that 
‘the unbelievers had to be fought’. With time, he realised that the ‘unbelievers’ were 
also human beings (ina adam). They were neighbours, met at work, and chatted. His 
and their children played and went to school together. He went with colleagues on 
 Sheikh Almis Yahya Xaaji Ibraahim, the most charismatic of the founders, 
was born in northern Somalia in the late 1960s. As a young boy he moved to 
Mogadishu, where he began his Islamic education. He later continued to study at the 
famous Al Azhar University in Cairo. From there, he moved to Finland in 1993 in the 
context of a family reunion with his wife who had become refugee there after the 
Somali state collapse. Cali Cumar Boosir, another founder of Jamacadda Geeska, 
was born in Mogadishu in southern Somalia. His family moved to Abu Dhabi in the 
1980s, where his father worked for a bank. In 1988, they returned to Mogadishu, 
from where Cali went to Finland in 1990 to study. The outbreak of the civil war in 
Mogadishu made him a refugee. Both Sheikh Almis and Cali found that the Finnish 
authorities valued the language and culture of the immigrants (Interviews, Cali Cumar 
Boosir, Hargeysa, 18 December 2008 and Sheikh Almis, Hargeysa, 07 December 
2008). This facilitated their integration in the host country and offered them 
possibilities to work by engaging with the local Somali community. Besides his 
studies, Cali worked as a teacher for Somali and basic religious education for Somali 
kids in a small town called Pori. Sheikh Almis became a mediator in family disputes 
among the Somali and Islamic community in Helsinki. Both cooperated with the 
relevant Finnish ministries in their work.  
                                                 
38 I was able to conduct longer interviews with three of them. The fourth founder was away on Hajj and afterwards 
otherwise busy during my stay.  
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trips to the countryside. He finally appreciated the way he and other Somalis, who 
had come to the country as refugees, had been received by the Finnish government 
and population.  
 
They told us ‘settle down here. We will give you some pocket money. Send 
your children to school. Medical care is for free. If you need medicine, just go 
to a Finnish doctor. You have the same rights as Finnish citizens in this 
regard.’ This made me reflect. These were good people, not like I had thought 
(Interview, Sheikh Almis, Hargeysa, 7 December 2008). 
 
There were also Somalis who continued to hold negative views about the 
Finnish ‘unbelievers’. Sheikh Almis and others became interested in dialogue 
between the religions and in cooperation with the local society. They arranged 
meetings between Muslim and Christian clerics; once they invited a Rabbi. They 
looked for common positions and strategies regarding burning issues in their 
communities, such as abortion or drug abuse. The Ministry for Justice and the 
Ministry for Social Affairs were happy about this initiative. Sheikh Almis stressed that 
he and his group were interested in ‘positive integration’ (falgal saxsan). This was a 
‘two-way road’:  
 
Something comes from us [Somalis, Muslims] and something comes to us. 
[Integration] is not a one-way street. Something influences our lives; for 
instance the language has an impact. For them [the Finns], we are a new 
people, a new minority, and a Muslim group. Therefore, our presence in 
Finland has an effect on the Finns. If the influence would be one-sided, on us 
only, then it would not be integration but assimilation (Interview, Sheikh Almis, 
Hargeysa, 7 December 2008, emphasis mine). 
 
Not all aspects of Sheikh Almis’ and Cali’s diaspora experiences in Finland 
were positive. Sheikh Almis mentioned occasional racism on the side of the host 
community. Cali remembered the manifold problems within the Somali community in 
Finland. These were mostly related to ‘cultural’ issues and family affairs concerning 
gender relations and the youth. Cali himself was well positioned to deal with 
upcoming problems. He knew Somali, Arabic, and Finnish well. He could talk with 
‘everybody’ (including members of non-Somali Muslim communities in Finland). 
These communicative skills plus his knowledge about Islam secured him an 
important position in the Islamic Society, a Muslim organisation in Helsinki, where he 
had moved in the late 1990s. There he met Sheikh Almis, who was active in this 
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society. Sheikh Almis recounted the burden coming with what he had called ‘positive 
integration’. He and likeminded Somalis had deliberately positioned themselves in-
between the two extremes among the Somali diasporic community, and were 
attacked from both sides: 
 
Those [who wanted to assimilate] used to call us ‘backward’. They called us 
wadaado [traditional Somali sheikhs] and presented themselves as ‘civilised’, 
as those who enter society and are something better than us – as ‘high class’. 
They used to insult us. The others [who refused to integrate] used to call us 
gaalrac [those who go with the unbelievers]. 
 
Muuse Muxumed Diriye, the third founder I interviewed, was born in northern 
Somalia in the second half of the 1970s and spent his youth in Somalia. Muuse left in 
the early 1990s to study in Pakistan. He stayed for eight years in Islamabad, where 
he also worked as a student assistant in a centre for policy and strategic studies. 
This work left a strong imprint on him, and he came to greatly value education, 
research, and knowledge. Muuse envisaged the acquisition of knowledge in two 
ways:  
 
You can learn either by seeing with your eyes and through experiences in 
daily life, or by studying books and conducting research. I wanted to contribute 
to my country in the latter way, based on the experience that I got from there 
[Islamabad, Pakistan] (Interview, Muuse Muxumed Diriye, Hargeysa, 24 March 
2009). 
 
5.2 Motivations for the engagement 
For Sheikh Almis and Cali, the idea to engage at home, in Somalia, developed in the 
early 2000s. Sheikh Almis’ assessment of their engagement was informed by 
religious and psychological considerations: 
 
We [founders] had the same idea why Somalia had collapsed. We knew that 
the reason for the state collapse was that the Somali person/personality had 
collapsed. His values, his convictions, his religion had collapsed. [The Somali 
person] became a living shadow. He is alive but lost the heritage of the 
ancestors. The people became uprooted. They had nothing more to believe in; 
they became like animals. Allah had already stated in the Quran that 
sometimes people just become like animals; they eat only. The first step for 
rebuilding Somalia is to rebuild the [Somali] person/personality. It was empty; 
something had to be filled in. The most important thing to fill the void is 
education. We have to start here (Interview, Sheikh Almis, 7 December 2008).  
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Cali confirmed that, around 2002, he and Sheikh Almis increasingly reflected 
on the problems of Somalia. The country appeared to them like a ‘factory that 
produces refugees every day; they leave the country and come here [to Finland], and 
the problems [in the diaspora] increase’ (Interview, Cali Cumar Boosir, Hargeysa, 18 
December 2008). This bred the idea to engage at home and to do something to 
improve the situation there. They (Cali Sheikh Almis and others involved) imagined 
Somalis in Somalia as ‘people in a boat without anchor and orientation. They just 
float’ (ibid.). The task of the diaspora was, according to Cali, to give orientation to 
those who are lost. Education seemed to be the natural starting point for this 
endeavour. Cali perceived ignorance/lack of education as the basis/root cause of the 
problems currently existing in Somalia:  
 
Only an educated person who has self-confidence can stand alone. Until a 
person reaches this level, he/she has to lean on something, either on the clan 
or on another person who gives advice. If the generation that grows up now is 
taught and understands something, then it can happen that they break with 
the past and say: ‘We are a new people, we are a new generation and we 
wish to have our own future.’ The previous generation brought about war and 
weapons; that’s how they grew up. I see education as the only solution [for 
Somalia’s problems]. But it will take a long time. Here is something we [as 
diaspora] can do (Interview, Cali Cumar Boosir, Hargeysa, 18 December 
2008).  
 
In Muuse’s view, education and development were closely linked. He 
compared life in Somaliland with the situation in the other countries he had seen and 
found that abroad people had work, the roads were good and clean, and one had 
access to advanced health care, good education, and entertainment. ‘When you live 
abroad and see how other people live and how their daily life is straight and fine, then 
you wish that your home country becomes like that’ (ibid.). Muuse saw the foundation 
of a university as a basis for the future development of Somaliland. ‘In order to 
develop, one needs people with knowledge who can lead the way; this is where we 
started’ (Interview, Muuse Muxumed Diriye, Hargeysa, 24 March 2009).  
Establishing a university is of course also an economic endeavour. In order to 
attract as many students as possible (who pay fees) the founders strived to open 
faculties that did not yet exist at the universities of Hargeysa and Amuud, such as a 
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faculty for economics, for Shari’a and law, and for computer sciences.39
 
 Muuse 
stressed that the beginning was hard. They lacked funds and economically the 
institution did not perform well. Only recently (after 2006) did the project become 
viable (Interview, Muuse Muxumed Diriye, Hargeysa, 24 March 2009). Besides 
economic competition, Sheikh Almis’ programme for Jamacadda Geeska included a 
‘pedagogical revolution’. He referred to some verses of a poem called Daba Huwan 
by the famous Somali poet Maxamed Hadraawi. In this poem, Hadraawi criticised the 
educational system of the past as unfair, corrupt, and producing unscrupulous 
servants of the regime:  
Iskuuladu waa deyeyn          Schools misguide  
Damiinnimaday dhigaan      they teach dullness 
Dartay uma soo lug go’in     they were not built for me  
Digtoor cadoway sideen      hostile doctors graduated from them 
Digrii nacabay sideen          with degrees in hatred 
Xaq bay garba duubayeen   they were standing in the way of the law  
Diintay gibil saarayeen        they were changing the religion 
Waxay dadayeen umuur      they were hiding/influencing a case 
Dhibtedu dib iigu tiil            that hangs over me 
Waxay doc faruurayeen      they were hindering 
Dedaal abid soo taxnaa       continuous efforts. 
 
Sheikh Almis explained that the previous system of education in Somalia had 
undermined the religious and cultural basis of the Somali. ‘It had produced a 
generation of egoists without religion, without a sense for the nation, who just said 
“give me, I want to eat”. So, we have seen what this system produced’ (Interview, 
Sheikh Almis, Hargeysa, 7 December 2008). Obviously, Sheikh Almis wanted to 
make a difference with the foundation of a new university. He said that this poem by 
Hadraawi was obligatory reading for all students at Jamacadda Geeska (ibid.).  
 
5.3 University organisation 
The founders from Finland put their money together and started the first college (see 
below). Once the project began to work and there was visible success, money was 
also collected in the diaspora. No particular association was founded, but personal 
networks were used to mobilise donors. The location of Hargeysa was chosen since 
it was, first, peaceful; second, many people lived here; third, in Mogadishu, which 
                                                 
39 Certainly, one could study business administration and accounting at Hargeysa University in 2004. Around 
2004, a legal faculty was opened there as well, supported by UNDP.  
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could have been an alternative location, a number of well functioning universities 
already existed, despite the ongoing civil war there. Certainly, the fact that two of the 
four founders had family relations in Somaliland also played a role. 
 
 
Figure 1. Jamacadda Geeska, Hargeysa, 2009 (© Hoehne).  
 
The first investment of Sheikh Almis and the others was a college called Mercy 
Academy in 2004. It was located in some rented rooms in down-town Hargeysa. The 
college closed after about one year, in early 2006.40
In 2009, around 300 students were enrolled in the university, roughly 40% of 
them women. The number of students had risen continuously since 2006. The 
 Subsequently, the project was 
reorganised and a new institution, Jamacadda Geeska, was established in Jigjiga 
Yar, a quarter at the eastern end of the city, in early 2007. The building the university 
rented was an impressive and brand new construction with three floors. Later on, 
Jamacadda Geeska bought some land nearby but had not yet started constructing its 
own campus, when I did my field research.  
                                                 
40 The Mercy Academy was mentioned by Lindley (2008: 408) as one of the ‘high-end’ educational institutions in 
Somaliland. It cost 700 US$ per year, and in return offered courses in business and IT that were accredited by a 
UK business association (ibid.). The high fees may have been one reason why it closed  in 2006.  
 33 
university offered three BA courses: economy and management, computer 
science/IT, and Shari’a and law. Each course took four years. The ‘major’ courses 
were complemented by some ‘minor’ courses in Arabic and sociology. These were 
compulsory for the students in the first two years. The first graduations are expected 
for summer 2010. The academic year was divided into two semesters of five months 
each. The fees per semester were between 150 US$ and 250 US$, depending on 
the subject (Shari’a and law being the cheapest). Applicants had to go through an 
admission exam. Every year, Jamacadda Geeska awarded the best among the 
newcomers with free tuition. Ten students in 2008 and 40 in 2009 won these 
scholarships. Most of the students at Jamacadda Geeska came from Somaliland, but 
there were also 20 students from outside the country. Nimco, the accountant of the 
university, mentioned that negotiations were currently underway with an Islamic 
organisation in an Arabic country on establishing scholarships for students from 
southern Somalia, Puntland, and Djibouti. While most students stayed with their 
families in Hargeysa, the university also offered dorm rooms (Interview Nimco, 
Hargeysa, 17 December 2008).  
The university has 15 teachers, most of them part-time.41
 
 The salary of the 
teachers depends on the subject and the number of hours taught, between 100 US$ 
and 600 US$ per month. Most teachers were local Somalis from Somaliland. Three 
teachers came from abroad – two from Kenya (they were Kenyan Somalis) and one 
from Uganda. The other staff of the university consisted of 18 persons, from 
watchmen to cleaners as well as the cook and the chancellor. Their salaries range 
between 80 US$ and 500 US$ per month. The accountant estimated that the total 
expenses of the university for 2007 were around 100,000 US$. Nimco added that the 
expenses for 2008 were higher, since the number of students had increased. 
Roughly 50% of the running costs were covered by student fees; the rest was paid 
through money for services offered and projects implemented by the university (often 
in cooperation with international NGOs), support from Islamic institutions, and 
individual donations from the diaspora, mostly from Finland and the UK. The 
government of Somaliland did not support the university financially (ibid.).  
                                                 
41 The part-time teachers typically had other jobs in private schools or businesses. Mostly they worked in the 
mornings in their other jobs and in the afternoons at the university.  
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5.4 University life and outreach activities 
The ‘culture’ of Jamacadda Geeska was strongly oriented toward Islamic religion. 
While Islam certainly plays an important role in all educational institutions in 
Somaliland, some particularities could be observed at Jamacadda Geeska. Most 
female students were dressed visibly ‘conservative’ and were carefully covered from 
head to toe. Some wore ‘Arabic style’ costumes, which often feature dark colours and 
black. This contrasted with the more light and colourful dresses of Somali women 
dominating outside of Jamacadda Geeska campus. Moreover, religious formulas and 
quotes from the Koran were extensively used by students and teachers in everyday 
conversations and public speeches.  
Regarding special learning/teaching programmes, it is worth noting that guest 
lecturers were sometimes invited to speak at Jamacadda Geeska. In February 2009, 
for instance, I accompanied Kemal Dahir Cashuur, a member of a local ‘low cast’ 
group called Midgan, who had been invited to give a presentation during a sociology 
course. The general topic was social differences in Somali society, in particular: 
gender and race. Kemal engaged in a one hour discussion with the students. The 
discussion circulated about the question why Midgan were disenfranchised in 
contemporary Somali society, and the students as well as the guest lecturer spoke 
openly about stereotypes and everyday discrimination in Somaliland. 
The university also comprised a research centre called ‘Centre for Research 
and Community Development’. According to Muuse, this centre engaged in various 
projects related to peace and conflict research in Somaliland. Its staff consisted of 
senior university personnel and some student assistants. Muuse outlined the focus of 
the research at the centre was on traditional and religious leaders. He stressed that 
particularly religious leaders have great influence on the local society. Most Somalis 
regularly attend the Friday prayer; people take the Imam’s sermons quite seriously. 
Here is where activities of Jamacadda Geeska and the research centre can start. 
The centre cooperates with religious leaders and engages them in discussions or 
practical projects related to peace. During my field research in early 2009, one case 
study of the centre was an ongoing conflict over land between two clans/sub-clans 
(Gadabuursi and Jibril Aboqor) residing in western Somaliland.  
 
For this case we went to [a place called] Ceel Bardaale, where the conflict 
escalated. Our team consisted of Sheikh Ismaciil Deeq [a popular sheikh in 
Hargeysa], the dean of the faculty of Shari’a and law [of Jamacadda Geeska], 
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and me. The elders who were mediating between the two parties in conflict 
called us and said: ‘We wish that the religious leaders take part in our 
mediation committee. When they talk to the people they listen. When we talk 
to them, it takes much longer.’ […] Thus, our task is to connect the elders who 
work for peace between the families/clans and the religious leaders whom the 
people respect and to whom they listen. If these two parties/institutions join 
hands in their work for peace then this is something new – a new model that 
can contribute to peacebuilding [kobcinta nabadda; literally: increasing the 
peace] (Interview, Muuse Muxumed Diriye, Hargeysa, 17 May 2009).  
 
Muuse also mentioned some practical aspects of this specific research. First, field 
research had to be done. Second, they had to be able to follow up the developments 
over a longer period of time, since conflict settlement among Somalis is usually a 
time-consuming and unpredictable process. Students can be part of survey activities 
or, more generally, process data at the centre. ‘The students participate in the 
activities, and we also encourage the other university students to participate [where 
possible] so that they gain important experiences’ (ibid.). 
In this particular project, the research centre at Jamacadda Geeska 
cooperates with the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), an international NGO with 
various programmes in Somaliland (ibid.).42
 
 Another project jointly conducted by 
Jamacadda Geeska and DRC had important implications for political and social 
stability in Somaliland, it focused on the dialogue between religious leaders and 
representatives of international NGOs in Somaliland.  
We called upon the two sides to come together and to discuss some difficult 
topics. The reason is the frequent misunderstandings and conflicts between 
representatives of the international NGOs and local religious leaders. The 
former think that the Somali sheikhs spread wrong ideas and hinder 
development; the latter perceive some NGO projects as inacceptable 
interferences in Somali cultural and religious affairs. The hot topics concerned 
the role of women, family affairs, but also medical issues such as vaccination 
campaigns [against polio] that were rejected by religious leaders e.g. in Burco 
[a place in central Somaliland]. The sheikhs told the people that they would 
become infertile if they were vaccinated (ibid.).  
 
Muuse explained that in the case of the vaccination campaign, Sheikh Almis and 
another religious authority from Hargeysa went to Burco, talked to the local sheikhs, 
and tried to convince them that their position was wrong. In other cases, however, 
Muuse indicated that he could understand the worries of the religious leaders. 
‘Sometimes the NGOs go to villages in the countryside with questionnaires and ask 
                                                 
42 DRC received funding for some of the peace/conflict-relevant projects from the Finnish government. 
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people very personal questions that deeply penetrate their private lives’ (ibid.). The 
issue of women’s rights was also problematic. ‘They [the NGOs] talk about women’s 
rights; but there are limits to these rights according to Islam. Of course this leads to 
long discussions’ (ibid.).  
 
 
Figure 2. Member of the student union of Jamacadda Geeska recites the Koran at 
the opening of Habeenka Sugaanta Geela, Hargeysa, 2009 (© Hoehne). 
 
Jamacadda Geeska also engaged in the cultural sector. One particularly 
successful event organised by the university, which I attended, was ‘The Night of 
Camel Poetry’ (habeenka sugaanta geela). It was staged in the Maansoor Hotel, one 
of the biggest hotels in Hargeysa, on 8 April 2009 and featured several famous poets 
such as Maxamed Hadraawi and his brother Hurre as well as a local social 
anthropologist. It was opened with a Koran recitation, an address by members of the 
students’ union, and a speech by Muuse, the Vice-Chancellor of the university.  
Much of the poetry that followed circulated around the camel as the ‘icon’ of 
traditional northern Somali culture and economy. The event was sold out, and the 
audience consisted of roughly 300 mostly younger Somali men and women (many 
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students of Jamacadda Geeska), who sat separately on the two sides of the hall. The 
poetry was enormously entertaining and represented a Somali culture that was only 
peripherally touched by Islam. Expressions such as aakhiro nin aan geel lahayn 
lagama amaaneyn (‘a man without camels is not welcome in the hereafter’) seemed 
to be quite far from scriptural Islam, and some of the love poetry recited later in the 
evening definitively went far beyond the limits of conservative Islamic morality. The 
audience, however, followed carefully; people’s reactions oscillated between hushed 
absorption and hearty laughter.  
 
 
Figure 3. Students of Jamacadda Geeska together with the poets Hadraawi and 
Hurre at Habeenka Sugaanta Geela, Hargeysa, 2009 (© Hoehne). 
 
The founders of Jamacadda Geeska stressed in the interviews that all aspects 
of their work were in accordance with the laws and regulations in Somaliland. The 
curriculum and the projects, in which the university engages through its research 
centre, have been communicated to and partly discussed with the relevant ministries 
such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Religion 
(Interview, Cali Cumar Boosir, Hargeysa, 18 December 2008). Muuse confirmed that 
the projects of the research centre were also discussed in advance with the 
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government of Somaliland. He added that as a university, they ‘do not wish to enter 
into politics’. Still, it happens that their activities are misinterpreted.  
 
Once, we held a focus group discussion in Boorama [a town in western 
Somaliland]. We brought local sheikhs, elders, and members of the civil 
society together. Some reporters came and wanted to cover the event. I told 
them that this is not necessary and that we do not want to have the media 
around. I said: ‘We are just ordinary people sitting in a hotel. Please excuse 
us.’ They [the reporters] translated this event completely wrongly. Haatuf [one 
of the independent daily newspapers of Somaliland] wrote the next day that it 
was suspected that Jamacadda Geeska held a meeting between elders 
coming from the south, from Somalia, and elders from Somaliland, with the 
aim to talk about the relations between Somalia and Somaliland (Interview, 
Muuse Muxumed Diriye, Hargeysa, 17 May 2009).43
 
  
More often, however, the public follows the manifold outreach activities of the 
university benevolently. The Somaliland Times, the other big independent newspaper 
in Somaliland, reported on a conference of religious leaders from all over the Somali 
peninsula organised by Jamacadda Geeska in November 2007. Even President 
Daahir Rayaale Kahin visited the meeting (Somaliland Times 2007). The event was 
remarkable since it demonstrated the unity in Islam and the common interest in 
peace of all Somalis across the otherwise strong political divide between Somaliland 
and southern Somalia. The Somaliland Times also reported on the meeting between 
religious leaders and representatives of the NGOs/international community working 
in Somaliland as mentioned above (Somaliland Times 2009).  
 
5.5 Students’ perceptions  
Safiiya44
                                                 
43 This certainly is a very sensitive topic, given Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1991 and its 
ongoing struggle for international recognition. 
 had started her tertiary education in IT at the college that had been founded 
by Sheikh Almis and the others in 2004. When this college closed because of 
financial problems in 2006 she had to search for opportunities to continue her 
education (which had already cost considerable money). She visited several of the 
other universities in Hargeysa (besides Hargeysa University, there are at least half a 
dozen other private universities in the city). Yet, none offered her a direct 
continuation of her studies. She even tried to go abroad, to England, but it did not 
work out. Finally, when the heads of the previous college opened Jamacadda 
44 The names of some of the students in this section have been anonymised, for obvious reasons.  
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Geeska in early 2007, she decided to enrol there, despite her worries that this 
institution could collapse again. Safiiya was critical of some shortcomings of 
Jamacadda Geeska, such as the lack of an up-to-date computer lab with online 
facilities. She was also disturbed by the fact that some teachers worked at other 
universities besides Jamacadda Geeska, particularly at Amuud University, and 
therefore were frequently absent or changed their schedules, depending on the other 
work. While she was now at the end of her third year, she contemplated going to 
Sudan and finishing her studies in Khartoum. ‘If you have a degree from outside the 
country [Somaliland] you find work much easier in Hargeysa. Otherwise, you need 
family support to find any work here’ (Interview, Safiiya, Hargeysa, 23 April 2009). 
Despite her worries and criticism, Safiiya participated actively in the university life and 
at special events, e.g., the Night of Camel Poetry. Besides her studies, she just had 
begun to work in an office in Hargeysa (with some family support). She emphasised 
that unemployment is the main reason why young people from Somaliland, with or 
without a degree, leave the country by any means. Regarding the members of the 
diaspora, particularly the younger ones, who return to or visit Somaliland, she found 
that ‘they have a different culture. Many became westernised. Some don’t pray. If 
they are not close relatives, whom I can help [to understand the local culture], I am 
not interested in them’ (ibid.). This last point was confirmed by other students of 
Jamacadda Geeska. They stressed that, economically, the diaspora helps people in 
Somaliland a lot. However, culturally, people inside the country and those abroad are 
different; this concerns particularly the younger generation (Group interview with 
students, Hargeysa, 5 April 2009).  
Ayaan was in her first year of business administration. She was very positive 
and proud of Jamacadda Geeska and the education offered there – and even in 
Somaliland in general. She stressed that currently Somaliland is the only place in 
Somalia where peace reigns, and ‘peace is the basis for education’ (Interview Ayaan, 
Hargeysa, 8 May 2009). Similarly, Asma, a twenty-year-old IT student at Jamacadda 
Geeska, stressed that the educational sector in Somaliland worked well. She referred 
to the complete destruction of the infrastructure of Somaliland including schools 
around 1990 and to the current boom in good quality education at all levels. Asma 
greatly appreciated that members of the diaspora care about and invest in their 
homeland; ‘this is an expression of national unity and patriotism’ (Interview, Asma, 
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Hargeysa, 7 April 2009). In her eyes, education helped to stabilise peace. Like the 
founders of Jamacadda Geeska, she  
 
Figure 4. Students’ Union, Jamacadda Geeska, Hargeysa, 2008 (© Jamacadda 
Geeska).  
 
maintained that only an educated person can value peace adequately; ignorance, 
however, was the basis for conflict.45
 
 Should Somaliland gain the rank of an 
independent state, she believed, the quality of education and the economic situation 
– and with it job opportunities for university graduates – would improve still further. At 
the moment, unemployment was a big problem, particularly for the youth (ibid.). This 
was confirmed during a group interview with ten students from Jamacadda Gesska. 
Some thought that international recognition could contribute to better economic 
development (Group interview with students, Hargeysa, 5 April 2009). Asma herself 
had a well-paid job. Besides her studies, she worked several hours per week in a 
kindergarten run by an international NGO. 
                                                 
45 This statement reflects a rather elitist and not necessarily plausible position.  
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5.6 Summary 
The foundation and programme of Jamacadda Geeska, particularly its outreach 
activities in the social and cultural sphere, strongly reflect the diaspora experiences 
of its founders and current heads. Sheikh Almis and Cali started reflecting on their 
‘Somaliness’ in the diaspora and recognised their responsibility, as Muslims and 
Somalis, for the well-being of their people at home, in a war-torn society. Muuse 
chose to give something back to ‘his people’ of what he had learned abroad. His 
concern was to contribute to social development through empirical research on 
socially and politically relevant topics. All three obviously have had a chance to gain 
higher education abroad. More importantly, they also learned about cultural and 
religious differences in the diaspora, and that tolerance and dialogue, together with 
research and critical thinking, can help to solve problems or to bridge seemingly 
unbridgeable (cultural and/or political) divides. 
The heads of the university were united in their ambition to help create a ‘new 
generation’ of Somalis who are equipped with moral values (based on Islamic 
religion) and the necessary knowledge to find their way through life and, most 
importantly, distinguish themselves from the pre-state-collapse generation, who had 
brought destruction to the country and the people. Muuse provided an instructive 
résumé of the university’s aims:  
 
The university tries as much as possible to contribute to the development of 
the society. We are still far from where we would like to be. We have to 
proceed slowly/patiently. We would like to produce students who know about 
poetry, religion, and the sciences, who are complete and have a broad 
knowledge. If we teach our students only one subject, if they learn only to 
follow the text book, then they do not learn to think for themselves. We would 
like that at the end of the education our students know their culture and 
religion and are firm in their positions.  
 
The success of this project is, of course, difficult to assess. It would require future 
research. At the moment, the students were certainly concerned first and foremost 
with their education and career opportunities. Nonetheless, the students I interviewed 
seemed to share the moral and religious orientations of the university heads. They 
also actively participated in the ‘special programmes’ and outreach activities of the 
university, which gave some students a chance to distinguish themselves.  
Genealogical/clan identity seemed to be less important than religious identity 
in the case of most people involved with Jamacadda Geeska. The founders as well 
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as the students belonged to various clans and came from different parts of Somalia. 
This does not mean that the clan identity of Sheikh Almis as Isaaq/Habar Awal and 
the descent of Muuse from the Dir/Gadabuursi clan did not facilitate some activities 
of Jamacadda Geeska in Hargeysa and Somaliland, where Isaaq dominate and the 
President was Gadabuursi until June 2010. Still, these relations, if important at all, 
were, unlike moral and religious concerns, not stressed by the actors involved in the 
university.  
Outside of the university, there were some negative voices suspecting 
Jamacadda Geeska of having a hidden Islamic agenda. According to my 
observations, there was no substance for such a suspicion beyond the fact that, as 
mentioned above, the university culture was ostensibly Islamic. Although this did 
stand out somewhat, it was in accordance with the rigidisation of Islam in Somaliland 
after the civil war.46
 
  
 
 
6 Case Study 2: Jamacadda Nuugaal/Nuugaal University  
 
Jamacadda Nugaal is located in Laascaanood, the capital of the Sool region. 
Laascaanood has not been destroyed in the civil war. Yet, after the fall of the 
government of Siyad Barre in Mogadishu in January 1991, thousands of refugees 
from the south who belonged to the local Dhulbahante clan by descent arrived in 
Laascaanood and surroundings, in their ancestral clan homeland.47
 
 Some of these 
refugees squatted in former government buildings, including the public schools of 
Laascaanood.  
6.1 Rebuilding education in the periphery 
Sulebaan Dheere was recognised as the man who opened the first primary and 
intermediary school in Laascaanood after the state collapse. The school was called 
Al Furqaan. Sulebaan himself originated from the Somali community in Aden, which 
                                                 
46 After civil war and state collapse, many Somalis sought refuge in religion and already long before the advent of 
the currently infamous Islamist militants in the south, a ‘rigidisation’ of Islamic practice and belief took place all 
over the Somali peninsula. Reformist Islamic movements set foot in Somalia already in the 1970s, as a result of 
work-migration (Marchal 2004).  
47 The Somali civil war came along with ‘clan cleansing’, which means that those who did not flee abroad fled 
internally to the areas where their clan-relatives predominantly reside (Lewis 2002: 263).  
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was part of the British Empire then and is in Yemen today. He became a military 
officer in Somalia, received some education in Russia, and came to Laascaanood for 
the first time upon fleeing Mogadishu in 1991. He valued education greatly and was 
convinced that it could contribute to the stabilisation of the post-conflict society and 
keep youngsters out of trouble (Interviews, Sulebaan Dheere, Laascaanood, 16 April 
2009; Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, Laascaanood, 15 April 2009).  
Sulebaan recruited a number of teachers, many of whom had come as 
refugees from the south, and talked to the parents and students. With the support of 
the local community (mostly the parents), he rented several simple buildings and 
established the first combined primary and intermediary school after the war. Quickly, 
several hundred students enrolled; they had to be taught in shifts.  
 
In the beginning, we had no money. We had no chairs or tables in the school. 
We simply put mats on the floor. Everybody sat there and learned. It is not 
compulsory to have chairs and tables to learn. Later, I found chairs for the 
teachers so that they could relax while the students wrote something 
(Interview Sulebaan Dheere, Laascaanood, 16 April 2009).  
 
In those early days, neither international organisations/NGOs nor the diaspora 
helped the locals. Sulebaan argued that the Somalis who had fled abroad in the early 
1990s were just refugees – they did not have much. The Dhulbahante who had 
already left Somalia long ago – for education and/or work – were too small in number 
to represent a potent ‘clan-diaspora’ (ibid.).48
To proceed with schooling in Laascaanood, some money was collected 
through school fees. Since most people were poor, however, not all students could 
pay. Families with several school children only had to cover the fee for one or two of 
them. The others were taught for free. There also were not many books available. 
Some of the former Somali stock were for sale and Sulebaan and others bought what 
they could find (ibid.). Sulebaan Dheere was headmaster of the first primary and 
intermediary school in Laascaanood until 2001.
  
49
In the late 1990s, the school situation improved. More private schools opened. 
Locally influential people like Maxamed Buraale, Xaashi Cabdalle, Sheikh 
  
                                                 
48 This points to the above mentioned fact that migration does not automatically create diasporas. Diaspora 
formation is a long-term process that depends, among other things, on the economic chances abroad. 
49 Subsequently, he worked as a prosecutor in court for the government of Somaliland. In early 2004, Puntland 
forces occupied Laascaanood. Between 2004 and fall 2007, Sulebaan was deputy of the Supreme Court of 
Puntland. After Somaliland had taken control of Laascaanood in late 2007, Sulebaan became head of the Court of 
Appeal in the Sool region – under the government in Hargeysa. This pragmatic adaptation to the political changes 
is typical for borderland elites in the region (Hoehne 2010). 
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Cabdinasir, Cabdi Cawad, and Axmed Cabdi Timir founded the Education Committee 
(guddiga waxbarashadda) for the Sool region.50
Over the years the number of students of the secondary school increased, and 
when Laascaanood came under Puntland’s administration in early 2004, Garoowe 
decided that the students’ fees were enough to cover the running costs of the school 
(Interviews, Sulebaan Dheere, Laascaanood, 16 April 2009; Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, 
Laascaanood, 15 April 2009).
 They coordinated the education in 
Laascaanood and the region in the absence of effective state administration 
(Interview Sulebaan Dheere, Laascaanood, 16 April 2009; Interview Cabdinasir Abu 
Shaybe, Laascaanood, 15 April 2009; Interview Axmed Daakir, Hargeysa, 3 May 
2009). The members of this committee managed to establish good relations with the 
now grown and ‘ripened’ Dhulbahante diaspora. They asked for help concerning 
educational projects and received financial support from abroad (Interview, Sulebaan 
Dheere, Laascaanood, 16 April 2009; Interview Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, 
Laascaanood, 15 April 2009). The first secondary school after the state collapse was 
opened in Laascaanood around 2000. It had originally been established in the 1980s 
as a public secondary school. It had closed in 1991 and subsequently been occupied 
by Dhulbahante refugees from the south. ‘In every room lived a family. These people 
were very poor. There was even a butcher who slaughtered animals in the former 
school building’ (Interview, Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, Laascaanood, 15 April 2009). To 
reopen the school, the refugees had to be ‘bought out’. Every family was given 250 
US$ so that they could rent other housing. The diaspora helped with the money and 
also agreed to provide the teachers’ salaries. The whole endeavour succeeded and 
the new school was called Muuse Yuusuf, after the man who had campaigned for the 
first secondary school in town under the Barre government (in the 1980s). Besides 
the diaspora, some international organisations and the government in Hargeysa 
contributed to the project.  
51
                                                 
50 Maxamed Buraale was a former Somali Minister under Siyad Barre. Xaashi Cabdalle had been an ambassador. 
Cabdi Cawad was a medical doctor. Axmed Cabdi Timir is an influential businessman. When I did my field 
research in Laascaanood in early 2009, this committee did not exist anymore and several of its founding 
members had died. 
 It is worth noting that throughout the 2000s, the 
actors involved in education in Laascaanood tried to relate to the authorities in 
51 While this was not indicated directly in the interviews, it is probable that after the occupation of Laascaanood by 
Puntland forces a part of the diaspora contributions were used for security matters rather than for schooling. I 
personally spent time in Laascaanood in 2004 and heard many voices back then, and again in 2009, which had it 
that Puntland did not bring any real administration, but it ‘just brought military’. After the occupation it was also 
clear that a military reaction of Somaliland was to be expected.  
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Hargeysa and Garoowe to gain something. ‘We are not politicians. Our aim is local 
development and education. We have our needs, and we try to use our chances with 
whoever supports us’ (Interview, Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, Laascaanood, 15 April 
2009). This pragmatic position should not distort the fact that the international 
organisations, which are important actors for local development in Somaliland, 
Puntland, and all over Somalia, were prevented from coming to Laascaanood. The 
place was qualified as instable by the governments in Hargeysa and Garoowe and 
de facto became a ‘no-go area’ for most non-locals.52
In 2009, Laascaanood had three secondary schools and about 20 primary and 
intermediary schools. Most of them were private schools in the sense that they had 
not been founded by any government but by local people, sometimes in cooperation 
with the diaspora or other external donors. Ismaaciil who was employed by the 
Somaliland government and was responsible for the education in the district of 
Laascaanood, stressed that particularly in the more remote areas the diaspora had 
built schools. Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe added that the salaries of the teachers in these 
village schools were frequently paid by the diaspora. Since Somaliland had taken 
control of Laascaanood in fall 2007, all educational institutions in the area formally 
came under the administration of Hargeysa. The government of Somaliland currently 
pays the salary of around 140 teachers in the Sool region (Interviews, Ismaaciil 
Xassan Dirir, Laascaanood, 15 April 2009; Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, Laascaanood, 15 
April 2009).
  
53
Approximately 10,000 students were enrolled in all school forms below the 
university level in the region in 2009. Twenty years ago, just after the civil war in the 
north, the number of students had been below 500. The number of female students 
had increased over the past decades (since before the state collapse), and at least 
up to the intermediary level, girls constitute between 30-50% of all students at 
present. This number shrinks dramatically, however, from secondary level onwards, 
because most girls have to help in the household and many marry already in their 
  
                                                 
52 This was the reason why I was forced to take an armed escort along to Laascaanood, which made 
ethnographic field research complicated.  
53 The Sool region, like most regions in Somaliland and the rest of Somalia (with the exception of some areas in 
the south), is sparsely populated. Most people reside in Laascaanood, which is the only urban centre in the 
region.  
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teenage years (Interviews Sulebaan Dheere, Laascaanood, 16 April 2009; Ismaaciil 
Xassan Dirir, Laascaanood, 15 April 2009).54
 
  
6.2 Motivations for the engagement 
The idea to set up a university in Laascaanood developed against the backdrop of 
what was already going on in the other regions of Somaliland and Puntland. The 
university project involved actors in the diaspora or with diaspora-experience (in 
Europe, the USA, and the Arab Peninsula) as well as those who had spent their lives 
in Somalia. 
 
Initially, the impetus came from the diaspora. It was clear that Laascaanood 
did not have many resources [to support a university]. But as you know, many 
universities have been opened in various regions of Somalia. Hargeysa, 
Burco, Garoowe – all have their universities. That is where the feeling came 
from that we want to have our own university (Interview, Cabdirisaq Lafoole, 
Laascaanood, 18 April 2009).  
 
Another consideration at the community level was that certainly not many students 
from the Sool region could afford to travel and live in Hargeysa for their studies 
(Interview, university delegation,55
Personal motivations also played a role. Cabdirisaq Lafoole, the current 
Chancellor of Jamacadda Nugaal had graduated from the pedagogical faculty of the 
Somali National University at Lafoole, near Mogadishu.
 Hargeysa, 10 February 2009).  
56
 
 When the civil war broke 
out in Mogadishu he fled to Kenya and finally to Uganda. There, he partly worked 
and partly studied at Makerere University. He received an MA in Agricultural 
Extension Education. Subsequently, he managed to go to the USA, where he lived 
for nine years and worked as an Employment and Training Counsellor. He moved 
back to Somalia in early 2007. Cabdirisaq’s wife and children reside in the UK, where 
he visits them once every few months. His engagement in the educational sector ‘at 
home’ derives partly from his diaspora experiences:  
I received my basic education up to the first university degree in Somalia. The 
education was for free. When I now see that my people are without 
                                                 
54 This pattern is similar all over Somaliland, and can certainly also be found in the rest of Somalia (Lindley 2008: 
403). Nonetheless, it is most characteristic for ‘remote’ areas and the country side. In big cities such as Hargeysa 
and Mogadishu, more girls reach the upper levels of education, and the average marriage-age is slightly higher.  
55 In February, a delegation of Jamacadda Nugaal visited Hargeysa. It consisted of Cabdirisaq Lafoole, 
Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, and Axmed Cabdi Timir.  
56 This was the background for his nickname. Nicknames are extremely common among Somali men.  
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government and without intellectual guidance I feel obliged to give something 
back. Moreover, when I lived outside of Somalia I saw how other countries 
developed. I felt that people in Somalia also should have such life chances. 
This compelled me to transfer some of the things I learned abroad to ‘home’. 
One of the important things I had realised abroad was that people in Kenya 
and Uganda coexist peacefully, despite their ethnic differences. Also in the 
USA, Europeans, Africans, Hispanics, and so forth live and work together 
without much trouble. In my country, people fight each other – people who 
speak the same language, have the same religion, are of the same skin 
colour, and have the same culture. I want to teach them about the peace and 
unity I saw abroad. I would like to confer the idea of the English slogan: united 
we stand, divided we fall. Even Europe is united now, after the World Wars in 
the first half of the 20th century. There is the European Union. I wish to 
contribute to the peacefulness and unity of my people. Working for the 
university was something I could do, instead of staying abroad in Minnesota 
and just watching what is happening in Somalia. I believe that education can 
bring a change (Interview, university delegation, Hargeysa, 10 February 
2009).  
 
Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, the current Vice-Chancellor of Jamacadda Nugaal, 
had studied Physics and Maths at the Somali National University in Mogadishu. He 
had fled from the civil war in the south to Laascaanood. There he had been working 
as a teacher since the early 1990s. In 2005 he had completed a BA in Business 
Administration at the East African University in Boosaaso. He also had a second job 
as member of the Board of Directors in an electricity company in Laascaanood. 
Cabdinasir confirmed that, like Cabdirisaq, he felt a debt. He had received all his 
education for free in Somalia before the state collapse. Since he had never left 
Somalia, he saw the children grow up without education after 1991 and realised that 
they would have a ‘black future’ if they did not learn in school:  
 
They will take up guns and kill each other. In this way the civil war will never 
stop. Therefore, we have to cultivate peace and knowledge. This is why I 
started to engage in education in the 1990s. But soon I saw that the 
youngsters who finished secondary school need a follow-up opportunity. They 
cannot afford to go somewhere else for further education. They need it here 
[in Laascaanood]. Without this opportunity, those who finished school would 
throw themselves away, they would try to migrate illegally [which is very 
dangerous]. Yet, if the students have a chance to achieve something here, 
they will stay. We also have children. We hope that they will have a future. 
Education can help in this regard (Interview, university delegation, Hargeysa, 
10 February 2009). 
 
Axmed Cabdi Timir, one of the big businessmen in Laascaanood, who had 
contributed significantly to the establishment and running of Jamacadda Nugaal and 
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is a member of the university committee, stressed that he himself had graduated from 
the secondary school in Laascaanood before the war. Thus, he personally had an 
interest to reopen it. He also saw the university as an asset. Axmed stressed that for 
his own business it is better that people have some education and do not roam 
around as militias. Finally, he felt a religious obligation to help the people and 
mentioned that knowledge and education are highly respected in Islam.  
Cabdinasir added that ‘if you want to develop personally, you need to better 
the lives of all. If only some make progress and others don’t, those who lag behind 
will hinder the others’ (Interview, university delegation, Hargeysa, 10 February 2009). 
Axmed Daakir, the head of the Red Crescent in Laascaanood who had spent the last 
two decades in town and who was a member of the university board, mentioned: 
‘Those who used to walk around with guns and chew qaad all day, now learn how to 
use computers. Many youngsters go to school these days and the stress and tension 
in the market becomes less. In the past, Laascaanood had been full of gangsters; 
people were killed and things were looted every night’ (Interview, Axmed Daakir, 
Hargeysa, 3 May 2009).57
 
  
6.3 University organisation 
Jamacadda Nugaal was founded in 2004. It started with little more than 40 students 
in three classes. Two classes focussed on business administration, one on Shari’a 
(Interview Ciise Ibraahim Muuse, Laascaanood, 15 April 2009). The initial budget 
consisted of contributions from the diaspora community (in the USA and Europe) and 
local businessmen in Laascaanood. Members of the Education Committee were 
involved as coordinators. Some of them became members of the university board.58 
The first years of the university were overshadowed by crisis. Roughly a year after 
the first Chancellor, Cabdikarim Cali Jaamac, had taken over, his close patrilineal 
cousin committed a murder within the local Dhulbahante community. To avoid 
becoming the target of a revenge-killing between sub-clans, the Chancellor had to 
flee Laascaanood overnight.59
                                                 
57 The problem of the armed, uneducated, and unemployed young men was in fact a general problem all over 
Somaliland throughout the 1990s. In Hargeysa, they were called dayday; in Laascaanood their name was jiri.  
 The university board elected Cabdiraxmaan Ilkocase 
58 The university board had 15 members in 2009, who were intellectuals, businessmen, or civil society activists. 
Simultaneously, the members of the board represented the most important sub-divisions of the Dhulbahante clan. 
59 In blood feuds between sub-clans that are particularly bitter – as was the case here – the relatives of the victim 
seek to kill the most prestigious member of the group of the killer. The university chancellor clearly was on ‘top of 
the list’, as several interview partners (who belonged to different Dhulbahante sub-clans) emphasised.  
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as next Chancellor. Soon, Cabdiraxmaan got into dispute with the teachers and 
some board members over the curriculum. The affair escalated into a power struggle 
between the Chancellor and the rest of the university staff. It was transformed into a 
‘tribal’ dispute when the Chancellor appealed to his sub-clan to support him and to 
consider the university ‘theirs’. He locked the university building, backed by some of 
his close relatives, among them also students. The university board tried to negotiate 
with Cabdiraxmaan, but the negotiations failed. The majority of the students insisted 
that they continued their education, and finally the university board, without the 
Chancellor, rented a new building where the university could reopen.  
Much of the previous investments into the university including chairs, tables, 
photocopy machines, and books (thousands of books had been donated by the 
diaspora and particularly by a man called Prof. Xayd, who resided in the USA) were 
lost or at least locked in the previous university building guarded by a particular sub-
clan. The Puntland authorities that were controlling Laascaanood at the time did not 
intervene. Thus, in late 2006 Jamacadda Nugaal was on the verge to collapse. The 
university board asked Cabdirisaq Lafoole, a member of the Dhulbahante-diaspora, 
to take over the position of Chancellor. Cabdirisaq agreed, under the condition that 
he could do the job part-time. He had just started to work at the Teacher Education 
College in Garoowe (the capital of Puntland). Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe became Vice-
Chancellor. He had already been a teacher at the university and previously had 
taught at the Al Furqan primary and intermediary school in town. The two men and 
their staff had to start from the scratch again. Due to a lack of finances, the Shari’a 
branch of the university was closed (Interviews, Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, 
Laascaanood, 15 April 2009; Cabdirisaq Lafoole, Laascaanood, 18 April 2009; 
Axmed Daakir, Hargeysa, 03 May 2009).  
Since the second beginning in early 2007, the university had developed well. 
In 2009, it had around 100 students, about 10% of whom were female. It offered BAs 
in Business Administration and IT. Jamacadda Nugaal had a small computer lab and 
the library was under construction. It also organised short courses in English and 
computer training. The regular BA courses ran for four years and the first graduations 
were expected for September 2009.60
                                                 
60 In fact, 22 students of Business Administration graduated successfully from Jamacadda Nugaal in September 
2009; four of them were women. 
 The fee per semester for each course was 
around 120 US$ (20 US$ per month). It was striking that quite a few older people, 
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men and women, were among the students. They had concluded their previous 
education before the state collapse and now continued a kind of second education 
(Interviews Ciise Ibraahim Muuse, Laascaanood, 15 April 2009; Cabdinasir Abu 
Shaybe, Laascaanood, 15 April 2009).  
 
 
Figure 5. Jamacadda Nugaal, Laascaanood, 2009 (© Hoehne). 
 
More than ten teachers worked at the university in early 2009. All of them 
belonged to the locally dominant Dhulbahante clan. Not all of them, however, lived 
permanently in Laascaanood. Several teachers commuted and spent only two days 
per week in town and at the university. The bulk of their work was elsewhere, in 
Garoowe. Two of the teachers had a diaspora background: the new Chancellor, 
Cabdirisaq Lafoole, who had come from the USA, and the IT teacher, who had 
previously stayed in Sweden. The salary of the teachers depended on the hours they 
taught and, in some cases, their extra expanses for travelling; it varied between 500 
and 800 US$ per month. Ciise, the accountant estimated that the total costs of the 
university were around 10,000 US$ per month, including salaries for all teachers and 
other staff, rent for the building (around 300 US$) and office material (Interview, Ciise 
Ibraahim Muuse, 15 April 2009).  
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The fees of the students clearly covered only a small part of the monthly 
budget. Cabdinasir, the Vice-Chancellor, explained that occasional contributions from 
local businessmen, but also from big companies in Hargeysa, such as Telesom and 
Dahabshiil, added considerably to the finances of the university. Moreover, 
Jamacadda Nugaal received limited funding from the government of Somaliland 
since 2008. For the running year (2009), the Vice-Chancellor expected a sum of 
around 18,000 US$ from Hargeysa. This shows that Jamacadda Nugaal is now part 
of Somaliland’s administration. The university leadership is eager to strengthen its 
relationship with Hargeysa and several delegations have visited the capital in the last 
two years. One result was that President Daahir Rayaale Kahin (2002-2010) agreed, 
upon a proposal from the local administration in Laascaanood, to turn over a plot of 
state-owned land to Jamacadda Nugaal for a future campus. The land is located in 
the middle of Laascaanood and has been fenced off recently with a stone wall built 
by the university. Cabdinasir stressed that, for the construction of a real campus, 
Jamacadda Nugaal would need 150-300,000 US$ depending on the size of the 
buildings. This money was (still) lacking. 
 A positive new development was the foundation of a University Committee 
(guddiga jamacadda) abroad, in Europe and the USA. This committee just had taken 
up some tasks, such as buying an overhead projector for the university (still to be 
shipped to northern Somalia). ‘If this continues, it can become a way to rebuild and 
develop the area. The relationship with this committee abroad can also introduce 
new ideas and advice, besides some concrete economic investments’ (Interview, 
Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, Laascaanood, 15 April 2009). By early 2010, Jamacadda 
Nugaal had become part of the externally funded SCOTT programme concerning 
teachers’ training. Every university participating in this programme receives funds per 
trained teacher per month. Usually, dozens of teachers particularly from the 
countryside are trained for around two months per year at the partner university in 
their region. SCOTT thus creates additional income for universities (Telephone 
Interview, Cabdirisaq Lafoole, 18 February 2010).  
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Figure 6. Graduation Ceremony, Jamacadda Nugaal, Laascaanood, 2009 (© 
Jamacadda Nugaal); left side: Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe and Cabdirisaq Lafoole 
congratulating students; rights side: Axmed Daakir giving a speech.  
 
6.4 Students’ perspectives 
The students I interviewed as a group presented a mixed assessment of the current 
educational situation up to the tertiary level in Laascaanood. They agreed that many 
schools opened over the past decade and appreciated the chances to study at a 
university in their hometown now. This was much cheaper than going to Hargeysa or 
Boosaaso. The older ones, who had seen the system under Siyad Barre, however, 
stressed that in the past the education had been better organised and free. Today, 
the curricula differ from institution to institution and people have to pay for the 
education. The older ones remembered that in the early 1990s many young men just 
walked around with guns and fought, looted, and killed. One senior student stressed 
that the members of diaspora engage positively in a number of local affairs. They 
support education, build houses for their relatives in the towns and villages, invest in 
some companies in Laascaanood (particularly telecommunication companies), and 
also become active when two groups fight each other. They pay for the cars and the 
fuel for the traditional authorities to meet and settle the conflict and contribute to the 
compensation sum (Somali: mag).61
 
 Still, the political instability of the place and the 
disunity of the people [concerning politics] limits the potential for further development 
(Group Interview, Students Nugaal University, Laascaanood 14 April 2009).  
                                                 
61 On the other hand, some diasporic actors still engage in conflict escalation between Somaliland and Puntland 
over the control of Laascaanood; see below.  
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Figure 7. Graduation Ceremony, Jamacadda Nugaal, Laascaanood 2009 (© 
Jamacadda Nugaal). 
 
Aamina, one of the senior students I interviewed on a separate occasion had 
been a professional nurse before the state collapse. She argued that in the early 
1990s, before most youngsters in Laascaanood had a chance to go to school and 
university, many were trying to migrate illegally, e.g., across the Gulf of Aden to 
Yemen and then further. ‘But now, we are lucky. The students can learn something in 
their hometown.’ Aamina had been among the first students who entered Jamacadda 
Nugaal in 2004. She hoped to receive her certificate in Business Administration in 
2009. She argued that large numbers of youths without education and jobs can be 
dangerous. ‘Previously, we had elders who knew the culture and who could settle 
conflicts. [After the state collapse] many youngsters came to town who had no 
education and didn’t know what to do. They just killed each other.’ Besides her 
studies, Aamina was the head of a newly opened nursing school in Laascaanood. 
She stressed that she wanted to participate in the development of the Sool region. 
Her project had not yet received help from the diaspora. She criticised those living 
abroad that they assisted the local health sector only occasionally; continuous and 
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concerted engagement was missing (Interview, Aamina Xassan Xuseen, 
Laascaanood, 18 April 2009).62
 
  
6.5 Effect of political instability on diasporic engagement 
The political conflict between Somaliland and Puntland that plays out in Laascaanood 
and its surroundings has a marked effect on the development of the area. It was 
already mentioned above that international organisations hardly ever come to the 
town. Cabdinasir, the Vice-Chancellor of Jamacadda Nugaal, underlined that the 
instability also prevents diasporic engagement particularly in the economic sector: 
 
If somebody wishes to establish a factory that costs a lot of money, he will first 
think about the security of the place of investment. Laascaanood is between 
Puntland and Somaliland, and war can happen any time. Therefore, people 
rather invest in Hargeysa or Boosaaso (Interview, Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, 
Laascaanood, 15 April 2009). 
 
In fact, compared to Hargeysa, Burco, and other places in Somaliland, Laascaanood 
was economically ‘barren’. Livestock and long-distance trade with southern Somalia 
and Puntland had previously been the backbone of the local economy. Yet, frequent 
droughts and the conflict between Somaliland and Puntland that hindered the 
transport of goods through the area undermined these modes of subsistence and 
income generation. Of course, the economic development of a place affects the 
educational sector, with regard to job opportunities for graduates. Clearly, most of the 
future graduates from Jamacadda Nugaal will have to look elsewhere for attractive 
jobs.  
Another effect of the political conflict in the region is disunity among the clan 
community in the Sool region and in the diaspora. Cabdirisaq Abu Shaybe mentioned 
that even the Education Committee in Laascaanood finally fell apart due to internal 
misunderstandings and tensions related to the political situation. Many diasporic 
actors stopped their support for Laascaanood, including money sent to the university, 
in reaction to Somaliland’s takeover. In their perspective, the town is currently under 
‘foreign occupation’. Those locals who remained or returned63
                                                 
62 The comparison of diasporic engagement in different fields, such as education, health care, services, and 
infrastructure building, would be an interesting future research project, to learn more about the preferences of 
diaspora actors.  
 were considered 
63 Thousands inhabitants of Laascaanood had fled in October 2007, when the fighting over the control of the town 
began. Afterwards, only some of the refugees returned. Those who were employed by the Puntland 
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‘traitors’ in the eyes of the nationalist diaspora, since they obviously made do with the 
new situation.  
 
For those who stay in the diaspora, the fact that Somaliland currently is here 
[in Laascaanood] is much direr than for the locals. In general, the only point on 
which most people [Dhulbahante inside and outside the country] agree and 
about which they get emotional is that Somalia cannot be divided [meaning: 
the secession of Somaliland is not accepted]. Still, most people here in town 
are willing to cooperate with the Somaliland authorities with regard to peace 
and development. Only those who stay outside [in the diaspora] argue: ‘we 
have been captured by force and our land and people have to be freed before 
we can think about development’ (Interview, Cabdinasir Abu Shaybe, 
Laascaanood, 15 April 2009). 
 
 All people I interviewed in Laascaanood agreed that Somaliland actually 
brought peace and stability to the area. Hargeysa also gave a helping hand to the 
university and to the schools in the area and is currently trying to establish a 
functioning civil administration. Recently, Cabdiraxmaan Ilkocase, the former 
Chancellor of Jamacadda Nugaal, who had locked the university in 2006, was 
imprisoned for a short while. It was demanded that he and his supporters return the 
property of the university, including books, chairs, tables, and a photocopy machine 
(Interview, Axmed Daakir, Laascaanood, 3 May 2009). The big development 
projects, however, that would be related to the arrival of international organisations, 
did not yet materialise.64
With regard to diasporic engagement, Jamacadda Nugaal is actively 
searching for new sources of support. Not all Dhulbahante in Sool and the diaspora 
are categorically against cooperation with Somaliland. Cabdirisaq Lafoole regularly 
travels abroad, particularly to the UK. There he combines family visits with 
 This disappointed many locals who had hoped for more 
from Hargeysa. Nonetheless, everybody agreed that the current situation was better 
than during Puntland’s reign (2004-2007), when security in Laascaanood was bad, 
killings and revenge killings continued unabated, and not much was invested in 
civilian administration. ‘Puntland just brought the military’ was what locals already 
said in 2004 and repeated in retrospect in 2009.  
                                                                                                                                                        
administration, but also businessmen who realised that the occupation is bad for the economy stayed away. In 
early 2009, a number of shops and houses in Laascaanood were visibly deserted.  
64 People in Laascaanood frequently voiced one particular concern that needed external intervention but so far 
had been left unattended: the bad quality of the ground water that had to be used for consumption by poorer 
families. Smaller but important projects like the local nursing school that had been opened by a small group of 
volunteers in 2008 were also hoping for support that was, however,  still pending in early 2009 (Interview, Aamina 
Xassan Xuseen, Laascaanood, 18 April 2009).  
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campaigning for the university and updating the diaspora on the ‘real’ situation on the 
ground in Laascaanood. The argument of the university leadership is: first, whatever 
political positions people hold, they wish to have peace; and second, education is in 
the interest of all, regardless of their orientation toward Puntland or Somaliland.  
 
6.6 Summary 
The foundation and continued existence of Jamacadda Nugaal represents the climax 
of a long and tiresome process of rebuilding basic educational facilities in a marginal 
place that is characterised by political instability. In the process, diasporic actors 
played an important role, next to concerned members of the local elite, some of 
whom have never been abroad but established relations to the diaspora. Cabdirisaq 
Lafoole, the current Chancellor of the university, mentioned that his diaspora 
experience had taught him about unity and respect among people in general, across 
ethnic and other divisions. This is what he wanted to convey to the people at home in 
Somalia.  
 While the reconstruction of education in Laascaanood had been a success in 
the eyes of all people I interviewed, it is clear that the ongoing conflict between 
Somaliland and Puntland over the control of the town and the Sool region has a 
negative impact on life in town in general and the educational sector in particular. 
The stop of remittances to Laascaanood after October 2007, when Somaliland took 
over, was a kind of ‘punishment’ of long-distance nationalists for their pragmatic 
relatives at home, who co-operated with the new power holders. The tragedy is that 
all people I talked to in Laascaanood in early 2009 emphasised that Somaliland 
brought peace and stability, while some diaspora actors push in the opposite 
direction: influential members of the Dhulbahante-diaspora met with ‘Puntland-
friendly’ traditional authorities and political figures from the Sool region in Nairobi in 
late 2008 and early 2009 to discuss the further political developments. There were at 
least rumours that weapons for the recapture of Laascaanood had been purchased 
with diaspora money. It was said that some Dhulbahante in London, who had 
belonged to the state apparatus under Siyad Barre, were particularly active in this 
regard. The political instability also prevents international organisations from 
engaging in Laascaanood and its surroundings.  
 
 
 57 
7 Education in difficult surroundings: comparing both case studies 
 
Both Jamacadda Geeska and Jamacadda Nugaal are part of the currently ongoing 
second phase of peacebuilding in Somaliland, as outlined above. In a very general 
sense, their existence provides the post-civil-war generation with a chance for a 
peaceful and personally fulfilling future. Nonetheless, the points of departure in both 
cases are quite different. Jamacadda Geeska is located in the political and economic 
centre of Somaliland. Furthermore, almost all international organisations that work in 
Somaliland have their main offices here. This provides students in Hargeysa with 
many opportunities for trainings and jobs. In contrast, Jamacadda Nugaal is located 
in the absolute periphery. Even in good times, the economy of Laascaanood is based 
on pastoral-nomadism and transit trade. The long-standing conflict between 
Somaliland and Puntland over the town and the Sool region increases the marginality 
of the place.  
The differences between centre and periphery also characterise the 
‘genealogical set-up’ of the two universities. Genealogical belonging plays a minor 
role in Jamacadda Geeska. Two founders are from the north, two from the south. 
Common aims, religious orientations, and partly common diaspora experiences seem 
to provide the intellectual and ideological basis for the establishment of the university. 
The students come predominantly from the north, many from Hargeysa. But there are 
also students from other parts of Somalia. People at Jamacadda Geeska do not see 
it as an Isaaq-institution. It is ‘internationally’ oriented. In the case of Jamacadda 
Nugaal, genealogical identity is very important. It is basically a university run by 
Dhulbahante for Dhulbahante. It is strongly rooted in the local community and 
depends on the members of this clan in the diaspora. Its vision was to develop the 
region. All students are locals. Thus, Jamacadda Nugaal is a kind of self-help 
operation of people residing in-between, in the periphery between Somaliland and 
Puntland.  
With regard to the foundation process of Jamacadda Geeska and Jamacadda 
Nugaal, the ‘diaspora consciousness’ of some of the central actors involved played a 
role. Vertovec (1997) stressed that the experience of dispersal, flight, and refuge, 
which often lies at the beginning of diasporic social formations, can condense to a 
‘diaspora consciousness’. This consciousness is shaped by the experiences during 
migration and in the country of residence. It includes loss and hope as defining 
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tension and frequently leads members of the diaspora to reflect on issues of human 
rights, social justice, and how to better the situation in the country of origin (ibid.: 281-
283). The migration and diaspora experience of the three founders of Jamacadda 
Geeska who I managed to interview directly feed into their current engagement in the 
educational sector in Somaliland. In the case of Jamacadda Nugaal, the lessons 
learned abroad also strongly influenced the current Chancellor. However, 
Jamacadda Nugaal was, unlike Jamacadda Geeska, a joint project of locals and 
diasporic actors. It therefore was directly born out of the need of the local community, 
whereas Jamacadda Geeska started as a ‘brain child’ of those abroad. These 
differences in the foundation process are also reflected in the current working of the 
two universities. Jamacadda Geeska is engaged in a number of outreach activities 
that arguably have the potential to influence the wider society through cultural events 
and public discussions on sensitive issues. In a micro-sociological perspective, this 
can be seen as one step in the direction of building a ‘new’ Somali ‘personality’ as 
envisioned by Sheikh Almis and others (as outlined above). This qualifies as 
peacebuilding education, which, according to Bush and Saltarelli (2000: 29), involves 
the problematization of issues, the cultivation of critical thinking and the provision of 
alternatives, not only in the classroom but also beyond. In contrast, Jamacadda 
Nugaal is mostly concerned with its own economic survival and with the development 
of educational capacities in the local context of Laascaanood. There are no 
resources for outreach activities in the cultural or social sphere. Still, the vision to 
teach fellow Somalis about peaceful co-existence was voiced by the Chancellor. 
Practical steps into this direction, e.g., through holding public discussions on burning 
issues in Laascaanood, have yet to follow. 
 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
The recent studies of the World Bank (2005), Rose and Greeley (2006), Davies 
(2009), and others highlighted that external factors such as government policies, 
financial resources, administrative skills, transparency, professionalism, and the will 
of the community to participate shape the effectiveness of education with regard to 
peacebuilding. Education alone cannot lead to the sustainable transformation of 
structural conflict factors and patterns (which is the definition of peacebuilding 
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applied in this paper). This point was generally confirmed by the material presented 
in this study. However, the situation in Somaliland deviates in two important aspects 
from the mentioned literature, which usually focuses on the relationship between 
state institutions, social and political developments and education. First, diasporic 
actors did have the capacity to provide the necessary financial basis to make 
education work in war-torn Somaliland for more than a decade from the mid-1990s 
onwards in the absence of effective state institutions and political initiatives in the 
educational sector. Second, intensive diaspora investments in the wider economic 
sector in Somaliland provided also job opportunities for graduates. More recently, 
these job opportunities were supplemented by the employment offers of international 
aid organisations that opened offices, particularly in Hargeysa. Thus, the diaspora 
took the lead and filled the void left by the state institutions, and it was impressively 
successful. The combined diaspora investments in the educational and the economic 
sector directly contributed to peacebuilding in many locales of Somaliland from the 
second half of the 1990s onwards. Enrolment in schools and universities became an 
attractive option for many youngsters in the country and an alternative to the 
militias.65
Arguably, engaging in education and economic development can also be seen 
as a vernacular, bottom-up modernisation project. Building schools and universities 
is, since the 19th century at least, usually a state-project. Doing so in the absence of 
an effective government is a highly ambitious, but also prestigious operation, for 
which fund-raising in the diaspora may be relatively easy.
  
66
Still, the situation of students in Somaliland in 2010 does not support the 
optimistic assumptions of Cassanelli and Farah (2007: 91) that ‘good education can 
help to reduce gender inequalities, child exploitation, and the likelihood of future 
violence in the wider society’. My study has shown that, while much more girls/young 
women are enrolled in educational institutions up to the tertiary level in Somaliland 
 Based on her research in 
Denmark Kleist (2009: 110) described already how Somali diaspora-activists in 
Denmark see themselves as ‘agents of modernity and change, contributing to social 
reconstruction and stability, and thereby, in the long run, to peace and 
democratization.’ 
                                                 
65 This goes even for southern Somalia, where the educational sector is booming, despite ongoing civil war (Horst 
2008: 332-33). Learning conditions there, however, are quite different from the ones in Somaliland.  
66 Clearly, founding local universities involves regional, but, in some cases, at least, also ‘clan-pride’. 
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now than in the past, there is still a huge discrepancy between male and female 
enrolment. Particularly at the universities, there are considerably more male than 
female students. There are at least two main reasons for this: first, Somali women 
usually marry relatively early, roughly between 18 and 22 (in some more remote 
places, e.g., in the Sool region, even earlier). Second, there are much less qualified 
jobs for women than for men in government institutions and in the private sector. 
Only international NGOs seem to focus particularly on the employment of women in 
higher positions.  
The biggest problem, however, is that the jobs created through diasporic 
investments in the local economy and even those offered by the government, the 
international organisations and the NGOs are by far not enough to absorb the 
steadily increasing number of secondary school and university graduates. This 
undermines Samatar’s (2001: 654) argument that common and future-oriented 
projects such as the foundation of educational institutions mark the ‘transition from 
peacemaking to development’. The economy did not develop as hoped for. In 2010, 
this leaves most graduates without the prospects they had envisioned when they 
embarked on the path of education a few years ago. Some of the factors that account 
for the economic stagnation are the lack of international recognition, the Saudi ban 
on Somali livestock (in place since 2000), the lack of political vision concerning 
‘national’ socio-economic development, and the rampant corruption within the 
Somaliland government. The more university students graduate, the more the 
discrepancy between the hopes of the younger generation and the economic realities 
in the country grows. This is in fact a ‘classic’ problem of many developing countries 
and can lead to new (violent) conflicts (Babyesiza n.d.: 5).  
This problem of underdevelopment is accelerated further in the periphery of 
Somaliland. If at all, lucrative jobs are found in government institutions and the 
international NGOs and UN organisations that work in Somaliland, all of which have 
their offices in Hargeysa. In contrast, Laascaanood’s local economy is very poor and 
international organisations are completely absent due to the political and military 
tensions between Somaliland and Puntland. Jamacadda Nugaal graduates hardly 
find any well-paid job at home. They have to either move to one of the larger cities in 
northern Somalia (Hargeysa, Garoowe or Boosaasso) or try to go abroad in search of 
work.  
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The interviews with students in both locations, Hargeysa and Laascaanood, 
revealed that migration (legally or illegally) is increasingly seen as the only 
opportunity to enhance the life chances of the younger generation. The ambitious 
and financially well-equipped students, who are usually supported by relatives in the 
diaspora, continue their studies in one of the larger universities in the Horn, e.g., in 
Nairobi or Kampala. Once they received their MA (in Somaliland one can only study 
up to the BA level) they either return with better chances on the job market, or look 
for work abroad. Others choose illegal migration in the hope to finally become 
recognised as asylum seekers in Europe or North America and to build a new life 
there. This is, of course, a long term project; its success is uncertain. A considerable 
number of students die on the way every year.67
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to end this paper on this somewhat 
disillusioning note. I agree with Samatar (2001: 642) that community-owned 
educational institutions have the potential to strengthen shared values and hopes. In 
the recent past, they were ‘essential to establishing collective self-worth and 
rebuilding inclusive polity and identity’ (ibid. 645). This was illustrated by the case 
studies in this paper. What is left now is that the government of Somaliland continues 
the good work in peacebuilding and development that was begun by local 
communities in cooperation with the diaspora. The framework conditions supporting 
the contributions of education to sustainable peace and development mentioned by 
the World Bank (2005) and Rose and Greenly (2006) and outlined above, such as 
sound politics and committed leadership, have to be systematically established. 
International organisations and NGOs may be able to help in this regard through 
targeted assistance. 
 The largest group of graduates 
accepts its fate in Somaliland and copes with unemployment or underemployment. 
Young men frequently succumb to the general fatigue of those spending much of 
their life time and resources chewing qaad, while young women may find ‘refuge’ and 
at least some social status, if not personal orientation, by marrying.  
 
 
                                                 
67 In 2008, the news that about 150 graduates from Amuud University drowned at sea on their way from Libya 
across the straits of Gibraltar shocked people in Somaliland (and elsewhere).  
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9 Recommendations 
 
To the government of Somaliland 
- Structure education nationwide in Somaliland; establish a legal framework through 
passing the educational law. 
- Assess the needs of the local communities and guide diaspora assistance to fill the 
remaining gaps in the educational landscape. 
- Develop curricula for schools and universities that are in accordance with the 
economic and other needs of Somaliland society.  
- Bundle expertise and capacities in key subjects such as teachers training, medicine 
and veterinary medicine and establish and fund centres for the study of these 
subjects; provide stipends for excellent local students to study these subjects. 
 
To the international organisations and NGOs 
- Support the government of Somaliland in its efforts to systematise education in 
Somaliland and to guarantee opportunities for education all over the country, also in 
the peripheral regions. 
- Open offices in the peripheral regions to give job opportunities to otherwise 
disenfranchised locals. 
- Offer internships to students during their education. 
 
To the universities 
- Establish regular cooperation with government offices, hospitals, private 
businesses, international organisations and NGOs for internships for students during 
education.  
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